Richard Hunstein v. Preferred Collection and Management Services, Inc.
994 F.3d 1341
11th Cir.2021Background
- Hunstein incurred a medical-debt (for his son) assigned by a hospital to Preferred Collections; Preferred hired Compumail, a third-party mail vendor.
- Preferred electronically transmitted to Compumail detailed consumer data: Hunstein’s debtor status, exact balance, creditor, that the debt arose from his son’s medical treatment, and his son’s name.
- Compumail used that data to generate and mail a dunning letter to Hunstein.
- Hunstein sued under the FDCPA § 1692c(b) (and other claims), alleging unlawful communication of his personal information to a third party; the district court dismissed for failure to state a claim, finding no Article III injury and that the transmission was not “in connection with the collection of any debt.”
- The Eleventh Circuit (per Judge Newsom) considered standing and the merits, holding that a § 1692c(b) violation can be a concrete Article III injury and that Preferred’s transmission to Compumail was a communication "in connection with the collection of any debt," and therefore reversed and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Article III standing (concreteness) — can a § 1692c(b) violation itself supply injury in fact? | Hunstein: statutory violation of §1692c(b) that disseminated private/medical information is an intangible but concrete injury tied to longstanding privacy harms. | Preferred: no tangible injury alleged; mere statutory violation without real risk or concrete harm is insufficient. | Court: Yes. §1692c(b) bears a close relationship to common-law privacy torts and Congress identified invasion of privacy as an FDCPA harm; statutory violation can supply concreteness. |
| Was Preferred’s transmission to Compumail a communication “in connection with the collection of any debt”? | Hunstein: the transmitted data plainly concerned the debt (balance, creditor, debtor status, purpose) and therefore was "in connection with" collection. | Preferred: "in connection with" should require a demand-for-payment or a multi-factor balancing test (Goodson) — mere data transmission to a vendor is not collecting. | Court: The ordinary meaning of "in connection with" is broad; the transmission related to collection and falls within §1692c(b). The demand-for-payment gloss and Goodson multifactor test were rejected. |
Key Cases Cited
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (framework for whether statutory violations constitute concrete Article III injuries)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (standing elements: injury in fact, causation, redressability)
- Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998) (standing is threshold jurisdictional question)
- Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013) (risk-of-harm standard: threatened injury must be certainly impending)
- United States Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749 (1989) (recognition of privacy interest in control of personal information)
- Muransky v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc., 979 F.3d 917 (11th Cir. 2020) (categorization of tangible harms and risk-of-harm analysis)
- Trichell v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 964 F.3d 990 (11th Cir. 2020) (FDCPA §1692e standing analysis; distinguishes kinds of statutory harms)
- Perry v. Cable News Network, Inc., 854 F.3d 1336 (11th Cir. 2017) (VPPA disclosure deemed a concrete injury; persuasive analogy to FDCPA §1692c(b))
- Reese v. Ellis, Painter, Ratterree & Adams, LLP, 678 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 2012) (interpreting "in connection with the collection of any debt" in §1692e based on letter language)
- Caceres v. McCalla Raymer, LLC, 755 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2014) (similar §1692e analysis focusing on content and demand-for-payment language)
- Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001) (statutory construction principle: avoid rendering provisions superfluous)