Richard Hershey v. Dr. John Jasinski, 86 F.4th 1224

In Sept. 2015 Richard Hershey handed out vegan literature at Northwest Missouri State University without checking the Student Handbook, which required notifying the Vice President of Student Affairs (or designee) prior to distributing "non-University publications."
A campus officer told Hershey he needed "permission," escorted him to Student Affairs, and ultimately issued a trespass warning barring him from campus and threatening arrest for future violations.
The University later amended the policy to add prohibitions on materials that are "illegal" or that "violate any other University policy."
Hershey sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking to invalidate the old and new policies as facially overbroad and to enjoin enforcement; the district court declared the policies overbroad, voided the trespass warning, and ordered remedial measures.
The Eighth Circuit considered standing and the merits: it held Hershey had standing to challenge the advance-notice requirement but not the prohibited-speech provision, and it rejected Hershey’s facial First Amendment challenge to the advance-notice rule, vacating the district court’s judgment and reversing the fee award.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Standing to challenge the advance-notice requirement	Hershey was injured: officer enforcement led to a trespass warning and a chilling threat of arrest tied to the notice rule	Defendants argued standing was lacking	Court: Hershey has standing; trespass and credible threat are traceable and redressable
Standing to challenge prohibited-speech provision (old & new)	Hershey contended the prohibitions were overbroad	Defendants: no injury traceable; new categories added after his visit and no credible threat of enforcement	Court: no standing to challenge either version (no causal trace or credible threat)
Whether the advance-notice rule is content-based (strict scrutiny)	Hershey said singling out "non-University publications" is content discrimination	Defendants said the rule is content-neutral and applies regardless of topic, serving order/safety interests	Court: rule is content-neutral; evaluated as time/place/manner restriction
Whether the advance-notice rule is an impermissible prior restraint requiring Freedman safeguards	Hershey argued the rule functioned as a permit-like prior restraint lacking procedural safeguards	Defendants: policy requires only notice, not approval or a permit; no administrative censorship apparatus	Court: not a prior restraint; text requires only notice so Freedman/Bantam safeguards do not apply

Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442 (facial challenge standard: substantial number of unconstitutional applications)
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (content-based regulation test)
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (forum analysis; time/place/manner framework)
Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149 (standing: threat of future enforcement)
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (standing elements)
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (intermediate scrutiny for time/place/manner restrictions)
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (prior restraint and procedural-protection principles)
Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (procedural requirements for censorship prior restraints)
Thomas v. Chicago Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316 (content-neutral permitting schemes not subject to Freedman)
Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (invalidates permit schemes making speech contingent on official discretion)