Richard Ford and Jamie Ford v. Candice Bland D/B/A the Diamond Mine and Robert Buchanan
14-15-00828-CV
Tex. App.Dec 15, 2016Background
- Richard and Jamie Ford had a ring refurbished at the Diamond Mine (owned by Candice Bland; Robert Buchanan involved); Ford later complained the center stone in the finished ring was not the diamond he selected.
- Richard reported the issue to the Pearland Police and filed an online complaint with the Better Business Bureau.
- The Fords sued Bland and Buchanan for DTPA violations and fraud; Bland and Buchanan counterclaimed for defamation and business disparagement based on Ford’s statements to the police, in the store, and to the BBB.
- The Fords moved to dismiss the counterclaims under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA); the trial court denied the motion, and the Fords appealed.
- Appellees submitted affidavits (Bland and Buchanan) contradicting Ford’s account and asserting loss of business from a customer who left during Ford’s in-store outburst.
- The Fourteenth Court of Appeals evaluated TCPA applicability, whether appellees established a prima facie case, and whether any privilege barred the defamation claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Ford) | Defendant's Argument (Bland/Buchanan) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does the TCPA apply to the counterclaims? | Ford: statements to police and BBB are protected petition/free-speech activity, so TCPA applies. | Bland/Buchanan: do not dispute TCPA coverage. | Held: TCPA applies to statements to police (petition) and BBB (public concern). |
| Did appellees present clear and specific evidence to establish prima facie elements of defamation and business disparagement? | Ford: appellees failed to show falsity, knowledge/reckless disregard, or special damages. | Bland/Buchanan: affidavits directly contradict Ford’s statements and show a customer left (special damages). | Held: Appellees met the clear-and-specific prima facie burden for defamation and business disparagement. |
| Were damages sufficiently shown (special damages for disparagement; general damages or per se defamation)? | Ford: no evidence of special damages; statements not defamatory per se. | Bland/Buchanan: affidavit that a customer left supports special damages; statements accused appellees of dishonesty (defamation per se). | Held: Sufficient evidence of special damages for disparagement; statements qualify as defamation per se, so damages presumed. |
| Are statements to police privileged (consent/absolute privilege) and thus subject to dismissal under TCPA? | Ford: (argued privilege) Buchanan had suggested going to police, so consent/privilege applies. | Bland/Buchanan: had invited Ford to involve police and expected such statements. | Held: Statements made to police were barred by absolute privilege based on consent; those defamation claims were dismissed. |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d 579 (Tex. 2015) (defines "clear and specific evidence" and prima facie burden under TCPA)
- Forbes Inc. v. Granada Biosciences, Inc., 124 S.W.3d 167 (Tex. 2003) (special damages required for business disparagement)
- Hancock v. Variyam, 400 S.W.3d 59 (Tex. 2013) (distinguishes defamation per se and per quod)
- Bentley v. Bunton, 94 S.W.3d 561 (Tex. 2002) (general damages presumable for defamation per se)
- KTRK Television, Inc. v. Robinson, 409 S.W.3d 682 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013) (statements charging dishonesty can be defamatory per se)