Richard Figueroa v. Michael Pompeo
923 F.3d 1078
D.C. Cir.2019Background
- Richard A. Figueroa, a Hispanic former Foreign Service officer, applied repeatedly for promotion to FS-01 from 2000–2009 and never advanced beyond mid-ranked in 2008. He retired in 2009 and filed administrative complaints beginning in 2008; EEOC affirmed agency decision in 2016.
- Figueroa sued the Secretary of State under Title VII claiming (1) disparate impact from the Department’s annual “fresh look” promotion review and (2) disparate treatment (denial of promotion in 2008 because of Hispanic ethnicity).
- Promotion decisions were made by two six-member selection boards using a matrix of subjective “core precepts” (many criteria, often subjective) that produced finalist rankings and numeric scores for finalists; nonfinalists received only low/mid classifications.
- At summary judgment the District Court granted the Secretary’s motion and denied Figueroa’s cross-motion on both claims. Figueroa appealed to the D.C. Circuit.
- The D.C. Circuit affirmed dismissal of the disparate impact claim for failure to show causation between the challenged “refresh” practice and the statistical disparity, but reversed on the disparate treatment claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the annual “fresh look” review has a disparate impact on Hispanic/Latino applicants | Fresh- look practice causes a statistical disparity (e.g., zero Hispanics promoted 2006–2008) | Statistics and evidence fail to show causal link between the refresh policy and any disparity | Dismissed: plaintiff failed to establish causation; summary judgment for defendant affirmed |
| Whether the Secretary met his McDonnell Douglas burden of production (2nd step) by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not promoting Figueroa | Figueroa argued the proffered reason (application of subjective core precepts; mid-ranked evaluation) was too vague to permit rebuttal | Secretary said the core precepts and evaluators’ declarations adequately showed promoted candidates were better qualified | Reversed: employer’s proffer was legally insufficient because it failed to give a clear, reasonably specific explanation of how subjective criteria were applied to Figueroa; case revived and remanded |
| Proper remedy/proceedings on remand | Figueroa sought judgment and trial on disparate treatment | Secretary sought summary judgment dismissal | Court vacated part of the District Court’s denial of Figueroa’s cross-motion, remanded for district court to (1) assess whether Figueroa made a prima facie case and (2) proceed accordingly; Secretary may later proffer specific reasons at trial |
Key Cases Cited
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (establishing the three-step burden-shifting framework for circumstantial Title VII proof)
- Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (defining disparate impact theory)
- Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Proj., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (causation requirement in disparate impact claims)
- Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (burden-shifting in Title VII and employer’s production burden)
- Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (role of employer’s evidence and judge’s assessment at summary judgment)
- Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (district courts should focus on third prong when employer properly articulates nondiscriminatory reason)
- Steger v. Gen. Elec. Co., 318 F.3d 1066 (11th Cir. 2003) (employer must provide specific reasons for subjective selection decisions)
- Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Title VII standards for proof and admissibility of evidence)