Richard Earl Madkins, Jr. v. State of Tennessee and Grady Perry, Warden
W2015-02238-CCA-R3-HC
| Tenn. Crim. App. | Oct 28, 2016Background
- Richard Earl Madkins Jr. was convicted in 1994 of especially aggravated robbery and originally received a consecutive sentence structure (an earlier 18-year sentence and a 60-year sentence that was later reversed by the Tennessee Supreme Court). A 25-year resentencing for the especially aggravated robbery occurred on November 4, 2003.
- Multiple post-conviction and habeas challenges followed: several earlier convictions used to enhance the 1994 sentence were declared void, the State agreed to resentencing, and Madkins was resentenced to 25 years for the especially aggravated robbery.
- Madkins has repeatedly sought habeas relief arguing (a) his earlier 18-year sentence expired in 2000 and (b) because of delays or calculation errors he should be released or not be required to serve the 25-year sentence; prior courts rejected these contentions.
- In 2015 Madkins filed a fourth habeas petition claiming TDOC records and a classification board showed he was being held on the 60-year attempted felony murder sentence (which the Tennessee Supreme Court had reversed), and that TDOC miscalculated his release date.
- The habeas court dismissed the petition without a hearing, finding the 25-year sentence had not expired; the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, holding Madkins failed to show a void judgment or illegal confinement and that administrative calculation disputes must be raised under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act.
Issues
| Issue | Madkins' Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Madkins is unlawfully confined on the vacated 60-year attempted felony murder sentence | TDOC records and a reclassification board show he is serving the 60-year sentence reversed by the Tennessee Supreme Court | Madkins has not shown he is serving the vacated sentence; his 25-year sentence remains valid | Court held Madkins did not prove he is serving the vacated 60-year sentence and dismissed the habeas petition |
| Whether the 25-year resentencing was void because of delay or prior sentence expiration | The 18-year sentence expired in 2000 and delay in resentencing rendered the 25-year sentence void | Prior appellate decisions and TDOC affidavit show the 25-year sentence is properly consecutive and not expired | Court held the 25-year sentence is not void and Madkins failed to meet his burden for habeas relief |
| Whether TDOC calculation/records establish a facially void judgment | TDOC forms/eTomis printout reflect conflicting expiration dates supporting his claim | Administrative calculation disputes do not render the judgment void; they are for administrative challenge procedures | Court held record-level calculation disputes must be raised under administrative procedures, not habeas; judgment is not void |
| Whether habeas corpus was the proper remedy to resolve the claimed calculation errors | Habeas is appropriate, per Madkins, to correct confinement based on expired or vacated sentences | Habeas applies only to facially void judgments or expired sentences; the burden is on petitioner to prove illegality | Court held habeas unavailable because the judgment is not facially void and confinement is not shown illegal |
Key Cases Cited
- Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251 (Tenn. 2007) (standard of review for habeas corpus is a question of law reviewed de novo)
- Wyatt v. State, 24 S.W.3d 319 (Tenn. 2000) (burden on petitioner to show sentence is void or confinement illegal)
- Taylor v. State, 995 S.W.2d 78 (Tenn. 1999) (habeas relief available only when judgment facially shows lack of jurisdiction or expired sentence)
- Stephenson v. Carlton, 28 S.W.3d 910 (Tenn. 2000) (definition of a void judgment where court lacked jurisdiction or authority)
- State v. Madkins, 989 S.W.2d 697 (Tenn. 1999) (supreme court decision addressing Madkins’ convictions and reversal of attempted felony murder)
- Stewart v. Schofield, 368 S.W.3d 457 (Tenn. 2012) (TDOC calculation disputes must be pursued under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act)
