Richard Dorsey v. Brian Cook, 677 F. App'x 265

Background

Richard Dorsey was convicted in Ohio of rape and three counts of gross sexual imposition and sentenced to ten years.
The victim was deceased at trial; the prosecution introduced the victim’s out-of-court statements via Kailey Mahan, a Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner (SANE) who interviewed and examined the victim and completed a forensic exam form.
Mahan testified the exam served both medical and legal purposes and relayed the victim’s account implicating Dorsey.
Dorsey argued admission of those statements violated his Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights because the victim did not testify and he could not cross-examine her.
Ohio Court of Appeals held the statements were non-testimonial because their primary purpose was medical diagnosis/treatment; the Ohio Supreme Court denied review.
The federal district court denied Dorsey’s 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition; the Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding the state court’s decision was not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether victim’s statements to SANE were “testimonial” under the Confrontation Clause	Dorsey: statements were testimonial because they were made for both medical and prosecutorial purposes and served as evidence against him	State: statements were primarily for medical diagnosis/treatment and thus non-testimonial	Held: Reasonable minds could disagree; state court’s determination that statements were non-testimonial was not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law, so habeas relief denied
Whether Crawford and its progeny compel treating dual-purpose medical statements as testimonial	Dorsey: Crawford and later cases require exclusion when statements foreseeably serve prosecution	State: Supreme Court precedent does not clearly resolve dual-purpose statements; no controlling rule mandates exclusion	Held: Supreme Court has not clearly established that dual-purpose medical statements are testimonial; AEDPA forbids relief absent unreasonable application
Standard of review on habeas for Confrontation Clause claim	Dorsey: (implicit) state adjudication conflicted with clearly established federal law	State: AEDPA requires deference unless state decision was contrary/unreasonable	Held: Under §2254(d) federal courts must defer; the state court’s application was not contrary or unreasonable
Role of “primary purpose” test (ongoing emergency vs. prosecution)	Dorsey: primary-purpose test supports testimonial finding here	State: circumstances indicate medical, not prosecutorial, primary purpose	Held: Applying primary-purpose framework, fair-minded disagreement exists; no reversal on habeas

Key Cases Cited

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (Confrontation Clause bars testimonial statements absent prior cross-examination or witness unavailability)
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (statements are non-testimonial when aimed at addressing ongoing emergencies)
Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344 (primary-purpose test includes consideration of the circumstances and objectives of an interrogation)
Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173 (statements to school officials were non-testimonial where primary purpose was protecting a child, not prosecuting)
White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697 (AEDPA deference; relief unavailable when fair-minded jurists could disagree)
Coley v. Bagley, 706 F.3d 741 (Sixth Circuit standards for habeas review of legal and factual determinations)
Lundgren v. Mitchell, 440 F.3d 754 (clarifying that "clearly established federal law" refers to Supreme Court holdings)