486 S.W.3d 898
Mo.2016Background
- Movant Richard D. Davis was convicted of first‑degree murder and multiple sexual and assault offenses based largely on videotape evidence and a confession; he was sentenced to death for Marsha Spicer’s murder and received multiple life and term sentences for other offenses. The convictions and death sentence were affirmed on direct appeal.
- Movant filed a pro se Rule 29.15 motion (with counsel-amended motion) alleging multiple ineffective‑assistance claims after an evidentiary hearing; the motion court denied relief and this appeal followed to the Missouri Supreme Court (en banc).
- Central trial mitigation evidence included testimony from defense psychologist Dr. Steven Mandracchia and Movant’s penalty‑phase testimony about childhood abuse; Movant later procured a post‑conviction trauma evaluation from Dr. Victoria Reynolds and a revised opinion from Dr. William Logan diagnosing bipolar I disorder.
- Movant’s principal claims: counsel failed to (a) retain/call a male trauma expert, (b) call Dr. Logan concerning competency, diminished capacity, insanity, and SSRI‑related intoxication, and (c) adequately prepare Movant to testify in guilt and penalty phases.
- The motion court rejected post‑conviction experts’ testimony as uncredible or cumulative, found trial counsel’s strategic decisions reasonable (partly because Movant was uncooperative), and held Movant failed to prove Strickland prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Failure to retain/call a male trauma expert at penalty phase | Davis: Dr. Mandracchia lacked specific expertise evaluating male sexual‑trauma survivors; a specialized expert (Dr. Reynolds) would have provided additional mitigating explanation and likely avoided death sentence | State: Dr. Mandracchia covered the same trauma themes; additional expert testimony would be cumulative; counsel reasonably declined to "shop" for a more favorable expert given Movant’s lack of cooperation | Denied — no clear error. Post‑conviction expert was non‑credible and testimony would have been cumulative; counsel’s strategy reasonable given client noncooperation |
| Failure to call Dr. Logan on competence to stand trial | Davis: Dr. Logan later opined Movant had bipolar I and was incompetent; counsel should have presented that at trial | State: Pretrial evaluations (Drs. Logan and Mandracchia) found Movant competent; Dr. Logan’s post‑conviction opinion relied on uncorroborated, post‑conviction self‑reports and was non‑credible | Denied — no clear error. Movant failed to prove incompetence; motion court discounted Dr. Logan’s post‑conviction reversal as unreliable |
| Failure to present diminished capacity / NGRI defenses based on bipolar I | Davis: Had Dr. Logan testified, jury would have seen diminished capacity or NGRI and verdict would differ | State: Pretrial experts found no basis for diminished capacity or NGRI; presenting such a defense would have been unreasonable and lack credibility given videotaped evidence and overwhelming proof | Denied — no clear error. Trial strategy reasonable; defense would have been unsupported and not prejudicial |
| Failure to present involuntary intoxication / SSRI ‘‘switching’’ defense | Davis: SSRIs without mood stabilizer caused or triggered manic symptoms (involuntary intoxication or mitigation) that counsel failed to present | State: Defense investigated SSRI theory; experts found it not viable pretrial; post‑conviction opinions rely on later, uncorroborated materials; no evidence injected to create viable defense | Denied — no clear error. Pretrial investigation done; SSRI claim not viable or would have harmed defense |
| Failure to prepare Movant to testify / right to testify | Davis: Counsel failed to prepare him for testimony (guilt and penalty phases), impairing his ability to be heard and possibly altering verdict/sentence | State: Court advised Movant of right to testify; Movant was uncooperative and declined to supply substance; counsel prepared outlines and consulted him; no specific proffer of what testimony would have been | Denied — no clear error. Waiver of testimony was knowing; no prejudice shown and preparation was reasonable given client conduct |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two‑part standard for ineffective assistance: deficient performance and prejudice)
- Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (U.S. 2003) (duty to investigate and present mitigating evidence in capital cases)
- Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (U.S. 2005) (counsel must review reasonably available mitigating materials)
- Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274 (U.S. 2004) (scope of relevant mitigating evidence in capital sentencing)
- Zink v. State, 278 S.W.3d 170 (Mo. banc 2009) (deference to motion court credibility findings in post‑conviction proceedings)
- State v. Davis, 318 S.W.3d 618 (Mo. banc 2010) (direct appeal affirming convictions and sentence)