Richard Blaisdell v. C. Frappiea
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 18782
9th Cir.2013Background
- Blaisdell, a Hawaii state prisoner housed in a private Arizona facility, handed a summons and complaint (prepared by fellow inmate Gouveia) to Classification Supervisor Christina Frappiea after she notarized a document; Blaisdell was not a party to Gouveia’s suit.
- Frappiea issued a disciplinary report charging Blaisdell with Conspiracy, Failure to Follow Rules, and Violation of Laws (referencing Arizona process-server statutes and PLRA screening), and a hearing officer sentenced him to 60 days in administrative segregation.
- Blaisdell sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging retaliation (Count One) and other claims; the district court dismissed other counts and later granted summary judgment to Frappiea on the retaliation claim after concluding Blaisdell’s asserted protected conduct was insufficient.
- On appeal, Blaisdell argued (1) the district court erred in treating him as having waived a claim based on his prior suits, and (2) serving process for another inmate constituted constitutionally protected activity (access-to-courts or associational rights).
- The Ninth Circuit held Blaisdell had disclaimed any retaliation claim based on his own prior litigation and rejected that serving process for another inmate was protected under access-to-courts or First Amendment association doctrines.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Blaisdell waived claim that prior lawsuits caused retaliation | Blaisdell contends the district court should liberally construe his pro se filings to preserve a retaliation claim based on his prior suits against CCA | Frappiea points to Blaisdell’s explicit statements disavowing a claim based on his own litigation, so that theory was waived | Waived: court enforces Blaisdell’s explicit disavowal and declines to consider a new theory on appeal |
| Whether serving process for another inmate is protected by access-to-courts (anti-interference) | Serving process is a litigation-related activity and thus protected against retaliation | The access right is personal and tied to Article III injury; Blaisdell has no personal stake in Gouveia’s claim and cannot assert it vicariously | Not protected: access-to-courts does not cover Blaisdell’s one-off service on behalf of Gouveia |
| Whether providing legal assistance (affirmative assistance) protects Blaisdell | Helping a fellow inmate (service) is a form of legal assistance protected by Johnson/BBounds when necessary to access courts | The right to receive assistance is conditional; prison provides alternatives (library, contract attorneys); Blaisdell did not show necessity or that he functions as a jailhouse lawyer | Not protected: no showing that assistance was necessary or that Blaisdell provided the kind of legal help warranting constitutional protection |
| Whether service of process is protected expressive association under First Amendment | Civil-rights litigation and assistance can be political expression/association; Rizzo supports protection for inmate legal-assistance activity | Service of process is non-expressive, one-off, and association rights are limited in prison; Rizzo is narrow and undercut by later Supreme Court decisions | Not protected: service of process lacks expressive character and associational protection does not extend to this conduct |
Key Cases Cited
- Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 2002) (pro se filings must be liberally construed at summary judgment stage)
- Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559 (9th Cir. 2005) (retaliation framework for prisoner First Amendment claims)
- Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996) (access-to-courts doctrine tied to actual Article III injury and standing)
- Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (prison regulations affecting rights valid if reasonably related to penological interests)
- Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969) (inmate-to-inmate legal assistance may be restricted only if reasonable alternatives exist)
- Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223 (2001) (limits on protection for inmate legal assistance; deferential review of prison regulation)
- NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (litigation as protected political expression and associational activity)
- Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540 (1983) (unconstitutional conditions doctrine context for retaliation claims)
- Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668 (1996) (retaliation as burden imposed because of exercise of constitutional rights)
- Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126 (2003) (association rights are among those most limited in prison)