Rice v. District of Columbia
774 F. Supp. 2d 25
D.D.C.2011Background
- Plaintiff Rice was shot by DC MPD officers Stathers and Starliper during an arrest; he sustained stomach injuries and required surgery.
- Medicaid funded Rice’s medical treatment; any amounts beyond Medicaid were written off by providers.
- Rice seeks to introduce medical bills at trial to prove damages and injury severity, but the court denies this request against DC.
- Against the Officers, Rice seeks recovery of medical costs paid by Medicaid; the court allows recovery only to the extent Medicaid paid, excluding write-offs.
- The court grants in part Rice’s motion for appropriate relief, reinstating Counts IV and V (negligence by Officer Stathers and the District) but dismissing Counts XIV and XV (negligent infliction of emotional distress).
- Counts XIV and XV are dismissed because they improperly plead negligence and intentional conduct; the court clarifies the need for a plausible negligence theory and expert support.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admission of medical bills against DC | Rice argues medical bills are admissible to show damages and injury severity against DC. | DC contends bills are not expenses incurred by Rice and would confuse the jury; Medicaid payment should reduce possible recovery. | Denied; bills not admissible against DC; Medicaid setoffs apply. |
| Admission of medical bills against Officers and collateral source | Rice seeks full or increased recovery by including all medical bills against Officers. | Medicaid payments limit recovery; collateral source rule does not fully apply to government-related defendants, and write-offs are not recoverable. | Plaintiff may recover only Medicaid-paid costs from Officers; gross bills and write-offs excluded. |
| Reinstatement of Counts IV and V (negligence) after prior dismissal | Rice contends Officer Stathers negligently discharged his firearm and District is liable under respondeat superior. | Defendants oppose reinstatement and argue previous dismissal was correct; late attempt should be barred. | Reinstated in part, conditioned on expert proof; sufficient independent negligence theory allowed to proceed. |
| Negligent infliction of emotional distress claims (Counts XIV and XV) | Rice asserts negligence-based emotional distress from officer conduct and District’s actions. | Counts XIV and XV are not viable negligence claims and rely on intentional conduct; no duty or foreseeability shown. | Dismissed; Counts XIV and XV fail to state a plausible negligent infliction of emotional distress claim. |
| Need for expert testimony and standard of care for negligence claims | Expert testimony is unnecessary or lacking; standard of care supports negligence claims. | Expert testimony is required to prove the standard of care in excessive force/negligence by police. | Reconsideration conditioned on plaintiff offering a qualified expert; without expert on standards, negligence claims fail. |
Key Cases Cited
- Hardi v. Mezzanotte, 818 A.2d 974 (D.C. 2003) (collateral source not applicable to DC for Medicaid write-offs)
- District of Columbia v. Jackson, 451 A.2d 867 (D.C. 1982) (Medicaid as not wholly independent; district funds Medicaid)
- Reid v. District of Columbia, 391 A.2d 776 (D.C. 1978) (setoff and Medicaid evidence; avoid jury invitation to speculate on payment)
- Scales v. District of Columbia, 973 A.2d 722 (D.C. 2009) (expert testimony required to prove police standard of care)
- Rayfield v. Lawrence, 253 F.2d 209 (4th Cir. 1958) (to what extent Medicaid payments can be recovered from non-government defendants)
- Manko v. United States, 830 F.2d 831 (8th Cir. 1987) (availability of Medicaid-paid costs as collateral-source recoverable amounts)