Lеon B. Reid, while a student in the fifth grade, was injured in a District of Columbia public school when a bathroom partition fell on his foot and broke it in two places. Reid, a minor, sued the District of Columbia through his mother and next friend, Ms. Twitty, claiming negligence on its part in maintaining the partition. A jury found for the defendant District of Columbia.
At trial, in the presence of the jury, and over the objections of counsel for the plaintiffs, testimony was repeatedly elicited from Ms. Twitty, both by defense counsel and by the judge, concerning Ms. Twitty’s eligibility for Medicaid and her failure to submit the medical bills in question to Medicaid for payment. Plaintiff-appellants claim that admission of suсh evidence was reversible error. We agree.
A cardinal principle of law is that, in the absence of punitive damages, a plaintiff can recover no more than the actual loss suffered. “[W]hen the plaintiff has accepted satisfaction in full for the injury done him, from whatever source it may cоme, he is so far affected in equity and good conscience, that the law will not permit him to recover again for the same damages.”
Lovejoy v. Murray,
*778
However, the jury should not be informed of the fact or amount of any payments; such information only tends to mislead them in their deliberations concerning a just, compensatory verdict.
Martello v. Hawley,
In the instant case, evidence of Ms. Twitty’s eligibility for payments from Medicaid was repeatedly brought before the jury in violation of the rule of Martello. In Martello, the court held that if evidence of payments should inadvertently come before the jury, an instruction should be given to disregard it. Here, the evidence was not brought out inadvertently but in part by the judge, and no instruction to disregard the еvidence was given. The case should be remanded for a new trial on this ground alone.
In their brief, appellants claim that under the collateral source rule, it was error to admit evidence of Ms. Twitty’s eligibility for Medicaid under
any
circumstances, either to the jury or to the judge. Both appellants and appеllee agree that evidence of compensation from a collateral source is not admissible to mitigate damages. Ap-pellee cites the general rule that
“. .
the receipt of payment from a collateral source may not be injected into a trial to mitigate damages. . . .” Aрpellee’s brief, page 6, quoting from
Jacobs
v.
H. L. Rust Company,
D.C.App.,
This well-developed exception to the general law is called the collateral source rule and has been adopted in this jurisdiction in
Hudson v. Lazarus,
In general the law seeks to award compensation, and no more, for personal injuries negligently inflicted. Yet an injured person may usually recover in full from a wrongdoer regardless of anything he may get from a “collateral source” unconnected with the wrongdoer. Usually the collateral contribution necessarily benefits either the injured person or the wrоngdoer. Whether it is a gift or the product of a contract of employment or of insurance, the purposes of the parties to it are obviously better served and the interests of society are likely to be better served if the injured person is benefitted than if the wrongdoer is benefitted. [Id. at 18-19,217 F.2d at 346 .]
This is not to say that the dеfendant should pay more than full compensation. But payments should not be reduced by the injured person’s obtaining money or care from a collateral source. It is better that the injured party receive a double recovery than for the wrongdoer to be relieved of its liability for damages. One of the purposes of negligence damages is to deter negligence and encourage due care.
Gypsum Carrier, Inc. v. Handelsman,
To decide whether evidence of eligibility for Medicaid is admissible to mitigate damages, we must first ask the question: is Medicaid a collateral source? Medicaid is paid for in part by the defendant District оf Columbia and in part by the federal government. In Jacobs, supra, the court held that reimbursement from a third party who is independent of the wrongdoer is from a collateral source. But, this leaves open the question of whether a source only partially independent of the wrongdoer is also a collateral sourcе.
When the compensation comes from someone other than the defendant, the situation is clear and courts generally deem such compensation to be collateral. The fact that it comes in part from the defendant tortfeasor does not itself preclude the possibility that it is from a collateral source. Because of the nature of the source, the *779 defendant may not be paying twice for the same injury. However, when compensation does come in part from the defendant, it is a close question as to whether the source is collateral.
In the case of
United States
v.
Price,
In the instant case, Medicaid is funded in very small part by the class of eligible people (which may be analogized to the class of employees in Price). But like the situation in Price, the benefits from Medicaid are not paid in anticipation of tort liability but only on account of medical injuries and financial neеd. Also, Medicaid does not come from the general revenues of the District of Columbia but from a special fund created for the recipient class of Medicaid eligible people. (See, e. g., Pub.L.No. 94-333, 90 Stat. 785.) •
In Russo, supra, plaintiff brought suit under the Jones Act for negligence on the part of his employer, Matson Navigation. Plaintiff was reсeiving $300 per month as a disability retirement pension pursuant to an agreement between the Pacific Maritime Association, to which defendant belonged, and plaintiff’s union, the Seafarer’s International Union of North America. Defendant wished to have its liability setoff by the present value of the pension. The court held that the pension was from a collateral source because (1) the pension although paid for by the defendant, was not received on account of the injury but rather as a fringe benefit of employment or a type of deferred compensation for services rendered, and (2) benefits under the pension plan may be claimed as a matter of right without regard to the liability of the employer.
Medicaid is not a type of compensation for services rendered, although it may be viewed as a fringe benefit of citizenship, and it may be claimed as a matter of right without regard to liability on the part of the District of Columbia.
In
Bradshaw v. United States,
143 U.S. App.D.C. 344,
Medicaid is paid for mostly by the federal government; the defendant District of Columbia pays between seventeen and fifty percent of the cost of Medicaid, depending on the per capita income of the District relative to the nation as a whole. (See Pub.L.No.90 — 227, 1967 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, p. 829, 81 Stat. 744 and 42 U.S.C. 1396d). However, as noted abоve, the contributions of the recipient class are very small.
Because Medicaid was established to provide health services for the indigent and not to compensate for tort liability, because Medicaid payments may be claimed by plaintiff as a matter of right and independent of any liability on thе part of the defendant, and because most of the funding for Medicaid comes from a third party, we hold that Medicaid payments come from a collateral source and are not admissible to mitigate damages.
*780 Although the collateral source rule is almost universally accepted, there hаve been attempts to have evidence of a collateral source admitted as probative of other issues.
In
Eichel v. New York Central Railroad Company,
In
Tipton
v.
Soeony Mobil Oil Company,
Here, appellee would have evidence of plaintiff’s eligibility for Medicaid admitted to show plaintiff’s failure to limit damages. Appellee cites
Parking Management, Inc. v. Jacobson,
D.C.App.,
The argument against allowing the collateral source exception, as explained above, is the prevention of unjust enrichment by plaintiff’s double reсovery for a single injury. But under appellee’s argument, evidence of the collateral source should be admissible to show that there was not a double recovery, i. e., plaintiff had a collateral source but chose not to use it, thereby implying that the collateral source of funds might still be available. Although evidence of failure to take advantage of Medicaid might be relevant to such an issue, that issue was inapposite to a determination of defendant’s liability. In other words, we find that the evidence in question is not probative of any material issue in this case. Its only effect is to confuse and distract the jury from its task of deciding liability and, if appropriate, the amount of compensation.
*781
Appellee makes the final argument that the Medicaid testimony was only relevant to the issue of damages; that since the jury found no liability, it never reached the issue of damages. Therefore, even though it was error to admit such testimony, it was harmless errоr. This exact argument was rejected in
Caughman
v.
Washington Terminal Company,
“We disagree with the suggestion of the Court of Appeals that the prejudicial effect of the evidence of other compensation would be restricted to the issue of damages and would not affect the determination of liability. That suggestion ignores that the evidenсe was presumably considered without qualification as bearing on a basic fact essential to liability. * * * ” [Id. at 218,345 F.2d at 435 .]
Although no limiting instruction was given in the instant case, the court in Caughman, following Eichel, supra, went on to hold that an instruction to limit consideration of the evidence of a collateral source to the issue of damages is insufficient to avоid misuse by the jury.
The admission of the Medicaid testimony was especially improper in this case. Even if plaintiff’s medical bills were fully paid by Medicaid, or should plaintiff have these bills paid by Medicaid before the new trial, such fact could not be used to mitigate damages. Even if we were to find that Medicaid is not a cоllateral source, and plaintiff’s bills were fully paid by Medicaid, this fact still could not be brought before the jury. Furthermore, in the instant case, appellee would have evidence brought before the jury that plaintiff was not reimbursed by a collateral source. Such evidence is not probative of defendant’s liability оr the extent of plaintiff’s damages. Instead, it is an invitation for the jury to speculate that if they find no liability, plaintiff will still be reimbursed for his losses through Medicaid. There was no evidence that Medicaid would actually pay the bills; there was shown only the possibility that it would pay the bills.
Appellants also claim as error the trial court’s failure to give instruction No. 144, “Invitee — Definition of and Duty Toward,” the repetitive nature of the court’s instructions not objected to at the time of trial, and the court’s alleged gestures in the presence of the jury. Although we would find no error on these grounds, it is unnecessary to reach these issues as our finding on the admission of the Medicaid testimony is dis-positive of the case.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.