826 F.3d 272
5th Cir.2016Background
- On Oct. 29, 2010, Officer Chris Thompson (Houston PD) stopped Ricardo Salazar-Limon for erratic driving; Salazar had been drinking and had a Mexican license.
- After an attempt to handcuff Salazar, a brief struggle occurred; Salazar then walked along the passenger side of his truck near a low retaining wall.
- Thompson ordered Salazar to stop, drew his handgun, and testified he saw Salazar turn and reach toward his waistband beneath a low-hanging shirt.
- Thompson fired one shot, wounding Salazar and causing partial paralysis; no weapon was found. Salazar later pleaded nolo contendere to resisting arrest and DWI.
- Salazar sued Thompson (§ 1983 excessive-force claim) and the City of Houston (Monell theories). The district court granted Thompson qualified immunity and entered summary judgment for the City; Salazar appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Thompson used excessive deadly force in violation of the Fourth Amendment | Salazar disputes material facts (e.g., that he reached for his waistband, turned toward Thompson, or was warned) and contends force was excessive | Thompson asserts he reasonably perceived an immediate threat when Salazar reached toward his waistband while uncooperative and intoxicated | Court held Thompson entitled to qualified immunity; no constitutional violation because a reasonable officer could perceive an immediate threat |
| Whether disputed factual issues precluded summary judgment | Salazar argues genuine disputes exist about lighting, warnings, turning, and reaching that should have precluded summary judgment | Thompson/City argue Salazar produced no competent evidence contradicting Thompson’s account that Salazar reached for his waistband | Court held Salazar failed to produce controverting competent evidence; summary judgment appropriate |
| Whether Monell liability against City can stand absent an underlying constitutional violation | Salazar asserts Monell claims (failure to discipline, train/supervise; ratification) tied to Thompson’s conduct | City argues municipal liability requires an underlying constitutional violation; none here | Court held Monell claims fail as a matter of law because no underlying constitutional violation was established |
| Whether municipal policy language ("imminent" v. "immediate") renders HPD use-of-force policy facially deficient | Salazar contends the policy is deficient for using "imminent threat" rather than "immediate threat" language | City argues municipalities need not adopt verbatim Supreme Court phrasing in policies | Court rejected the facial challenge; municipalities need not mirror specific case-law phrasing |
Key Cases Cited
- Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (municipal liability requires that a policy or custom cause a constitutional violation)
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (use-of-force excessive-force factors and objective-reasonableness standard)
- Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) (two-step qualified immunity framework)
- Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986) (qualified immunity protects all but plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (summary judgment standard)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (genuine issue of material fact standard)
- Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069 (5th Cir. 1994) (plaintiff must produce competent evidence to defeat summary judgment)
- Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156 (5th Cir. 2009) (view facts favoring nonmoving party; excessive-force analysis)
- Carnaby v. City of Houston, 636 F.3d 183 (5th Cir. 2011) (deadly force reasonable when officer has reason to believe suspect poses serious threat)
- Manis v. Lawson, 585 F.3d 839 (5th Cir. 2009) (deadly force reasonable when suspect moves out of sight such that officer could reasonably believe suspect was reaching for a weapon)