Ricardo Prudencio v. Eric Holder, Jr.
2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 1693
| 4th Cir. | 2012Background
- Prudencio is a native of El Salvador who obtained lawful permanent resident status in the United States.
- In 2010, Prudencio pled guilty to the amended charge of contributing to the delinquency of a minor under Va. Code § 18.2-371, a Virginia misdemeanor.
- DHS charged Prudencio with removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A) for a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years of admission that could have carried a year or more in prison.
- The underlying delinquency statute covers two subsections, with subsection (ii) (consensual sex with a minor 15 or older) generally deemed to involve moral turpitude, and subsection (i) not necessarily so.
- The immigration judge applied the Silva-Trevino three-step framework (categorical, modified categorical, then third-step evidence) to determine whether the conviction involved moral turpitude.
- The Board of Immigration Appeals upheld removal on this framework, and Prudencio challenged the framework as an improper Chevron deference-based construction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Silva-Trevino framework is authorized under Chevron | Prudencio contends framework is not authorized; statute is not ambiguous. | DHS argues framework fills a gap where statute is ambiguous. | Silva-Trevino framework not authorized; vacate Board decision |
| Whether a conviction under Va. Code § 18.2-371(ii) constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude | Record insufficient to show conviction under (ii); otherwise would be moral turpitude. | Subsection (ii) inherently involves moral turpitude; the conviction should be so classified. | Conviction under (ii) constitutes crime involving moral turpitude; however, record insufficient under modified categorical approach to prove conviction under (ii) in this case |
| Whether the government was permitted to rely on third-step evidence to resolve moral turpitude | Evidence beyond record should be allowed to resolve the moral turpitude question. | Third-step evidence is permissible only if necessary and appropriate and within limits. | Third-step evidence is not permitted here; immigration judge erred by relying on such evidence to sustain removal |
Key Cases Cited
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (categorical approach in ACCA context; framework influence on analytic methods)
- Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005) (modified categorical approach; reliance on record of conviction)
- Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687 (A.G. 2008) (three-step framework permitting extra-record evidence)
- Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29 (2009) (circumstance-specific approach in some immigrant contexts)
- Yousefi v. U.S. INS, 260 F.3d 318 (4th Cir.2001) (Chevron deference in moral turpitude interpretation)
- Jean-Louis v. Attorney General, 582 F.3d 462 (3d Cir.2009) (treats statutory ambiguity differently; not binding in this circuit)