899 F.3d 1236
11th Cir.2018Background
- Ricardo Colon pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and was sentenced to 188 months based on an ACCA enhancement.
- The presentence report relied on three prior convictions to trigger ACCA: a 1995 Florida resisting-with-violence conviction and two 2003 Indiana aggravated-battery convictions (one against an officer; one against a child under 14).
- The district court initially treated the Indiana convictions as ACCA predicates under the now-invalidated residual clause; on § 2255 review it concluded they still qualified under the ACCA’s elements clause.
- Colon argued (post-Johnson) that the Indiana felony-battery statute, which requires “bodily injury” defined to include "physical pain," does not necessarily require the use of "physical force" as defined by the ACCA elements clause.
- The Eleventh Circuit reviewed de novo and applied its precedent interpreting "physical force" to mean force capable of causing physical pain or injury, concluding Indiana’s felony battery requires such force.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Indiana felony-battery convictions qualify as "violent felonies" under the ACCA elements clause | Colon: "Bodily injury" can be satisfied by minor contact and therefore may not require the "physical force" the ACCA demands | Government: Indiana’s "bodily injury" includes physical pain, which requires force capable of causing pain or injury, meeting the ACCA elements clause | The convictions qualify as ACCA violent felonies because "bodily injury" necessarily entails force capable of causing physical pain or injury |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) ("physical force" means violent force capable of causing pain or injury)
- United States v. Vail-Bailon, 868 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2017) (applies Curtis Johnson test: offense requires force capable of causing pain/injury)
- United States v. Castleman, 572 U.S. 157 (2014) (holding bodily injury cannot occur without force capable of producing that result)
- Yates v. United States, 842 F.3d 1051 (7th Cir. 2016) (upholding that statutes defining bodily harm as pain/injury satisfy Curtis Johnson when force is capable of causing pain)
- Colon v. United States, [citation="458 F. App'x 825"] (11th Cir. 2012) (prior unpublished appeal affirming sentence enhancement)