982 F.3d 403
5th Cir.2020Background
- Stelly, a longshoreman, worked at union hiring halls in south Texas and affiliated with ILA Locals 1316 and 21; Duriso was a board member and coworker.
- Duriso repeatedly made sexual propositions, described sexual acts, threatened to block her work if she refused, and continued harassment after internal complaints and a suspension.
- Stelly sued Duriso (IIED under Texas law) and the unions/WGMA (Title VII claims). Duriso evaded service and did not defend.
- The district court entered default judgment against Duriso on the IIED claim and awarded $75,000; the court later certified that judgment under Rule 54(b).
- Stelly proceeded to trial on Title VII claims and prevailed against ILA Local 21; Duriso appealed the default judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a defaulting defendant must file a Rule 60(b) motion in district court before appealing a default judgment | Stelly did not argue a Rule 60(b) exhaustion requirement; implied position that appeal may proceed | Duriso argued he could appeal without first moving under Rule 60(b) | Court held failure to move under Rule 60(b) does not bar appeal; final default judgments are appealable and no statute requires Rule 60(b) exhaustion |
| Whether an IIED claim against a coworker/supervisor is barred where statutory remedies (Title VII/TCHRA) cover the harassment | IIED alleged extreme, outrageous sexual harassment and retaliation by Duriso warranting damages | Duriso argued IIED is a gap-filler tort not available when statutory remedies based on same conduct exist | Court held IIED was foreclosed because the gravamen was sexual harassment and Stelly had statutory remedies (Title VII claims against the unions); vacated default judgment on IIED and remanded |
Key Cases Cited
- Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Zeltwanger, 144 S.W.3d 438 (Tex. 2004) (IIED is a gap-filler; unavailable when other remedies address the misconduct)
- Creditwatch, Inc. v. Jackson, 157 S.W.3d 814 (Tex. 2005) (IIED claims premised on lewd advances covered by statutory remedies are rejected)
- Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. 1993) (adopting IIED cause of action and emphasizing rigorous standard)
- Standard Fruit & Vegetable Co. v. Johnson, 985 S.W.2d 62 (Tex. 1998) (elements of IIED under Texas law)
- Recreational Props., Inc. v. Sw. Mortg. Serv. Corp., 804 F.2d 311 (5th Cir.) (default judgment is a final judgment subject to immediate appeal)
- Pecarsky v. Galaxiworld.com, Ltd., 249 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 2001) (vacating default judgment on appeal without prior Rule 60 motion)
- Wooten v. McDonald Transit Assocs., Inc., 788 F.3d 490 (5th Cir. 2015) (standard of review for default-judgment abuse of discretion)
- Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chi., 138 S. Ct. 13 (2017) (only statutes, not court-made rules, can be jurisdictional)