Rhonda Ezell v. City of Chicago
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 14108
| 7th Cir. | 2011Background
- After McDonald, Chicago replaced its handgun ban with the Responsible Gun Owners Ordinance (RGOO) imposing extensive firearm restrictions and a permit regime.
- The Ordinance prohibits firing ranges citywide while requiring one hour of live-range training as a permit prerequisite, and also imposes a complex permitting and registration scheme for firearms.
- Firing ranges are banned throughout Chicago, with limited exemptions for government and some private security ranges; penalties for violations include fines and incarceration.
- Plaintiffs include three Chicago residents (Ezell, Hespen, Brown) who seek to train at ranges, and three associations (Action Target, Second Amendment Foundation, Illinois State Rifle Association) that advocate for gun rights and range access.
- The district court denied a TRO and preliminarily injunction, finding plaintiffs had no irreparable harm and weak likelihood of success, and it did not conduct merits-style scrutiny.
- On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding the district court erred in standing analysis, irreparable-harm assessment, framework for Second Amendment review, and in evaluating the scope and limits of the right to train and possess firearms.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Do the organizational plaintiffs have standing? | Action Target and associations have associational standing to defend members’ rights. | Only individual rights matter; organizations lack standing to challenge the ban. | Yes; organizational standing exists under associational standing principles. |
| Is the firing-range ban irreparably harmful and is damages remedy adequate? | Range training is integral to the Second Amendment; banning ranges causes irreparable, ongoing injury. | Any harm is travel-related and compensable by damages; no irreparable harm. | Irreparable harm is shown; damages are not an adequate remedy for a First/Second Amendment injury. |
| What standard of review applies to a firing-range ban under the Second Amendment? | The ban implicates core Second Amendment rights; heightened scrutiny applies. | Novel case; defer to established standards; district court erred by avoiding scrutiny. | A framework akin to heightened scrutiny applies; the government must justify the ban with a close fit to strong public interests. |
| Does range training fall within the scope of the Second Amendment, and is the ban constitutional under the chosen framework? | Training is essential to the right to keep and bear arms for self-defense; banning ranges infringes core rights. | Training is not protected; the ban targets conduct outside the core right and may be regulated. | Range training is within the scope; the ban cannot survive scrutiny given lack of evidence and overbreadth. |
| Should the district court’s breadth of remedies be limited to the range-ban itself or include related provisions? | Enjoin the entire set of provisions indirectly restricting range training. | Only the specific range ban should be addressed; other provisions remain appropriate subject to challenge. | injunction should cover the range ban and related provisions that hinder training or possession consistent with the Second Amendment. |
Key Cases Cited
- District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (U.S. 2008) (core component of right is self-defense and possession of operable handguns)
- McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (U.S. 2010) (Second Amendment applies to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment)
- Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488 (U.S. 2009) (standing and irreparable harm considerations raised)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (U.S. 1992) (standing requires actual or imminent injury and redressability)
- United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010) (form of strong showing for Second Amendment challenge; intermediate scrutiny in some contexts)
- Nordyke v. King, 644 F.3d 776 (9th Cir. 2011) (gatekeeping substantial-burden approach to Second Amendment scrutiny)
- Chester v. United States, 628 F.3d 673 (4th Cir. 2011) (two-pronged framework for Second Amendment challenges (scope then scrutiny))
- Campbell v. Miller, 373 F.3d 834 (7th Cir. 2004) (standing and damages considerations in constitutional challenges)
- Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (U.S. 1993) (facial challenges and scope of statute)