Rhonda BANWART, Appellant, v. 50TH STREET SPORTS, L.L.C. D/B/A Draught House 50, Appellee.
910 N.W.2d 540
| Iowa | 2018Background
- On Feb. 27, 2015 Michelle Campbell drank at Draught House 50 from ~4:30–8:30 p.m.; she later drove and rear-ended Rhonda Banwart minutes after leaving the bar.
- Campbell told the responding officer she had three beers and felt “buzzed.” Officer Graham smelled alcohol, observed bloodshot/watery eyes, slurred speech, poor performance on sobriety tests, and later recorded a Datamaster BAC of .143; Campbell pled guilty to OWI.
- Banwart sued both Campbell (negligence) and Draught House 50 under Iowa’s dramshop statute alleging the bar sold and served alcohol when it knew or should have known Campbell was or would become intoxicated.
- The district court granted summary judgment for Draught House 50 (court found three beers over four hours, without more, insufficient to show the bar knew or should have known Campbell was or would become intoxicated).
- The court of appeals affirmed; the Iowa Supreme Court granted further review and reversed, holding a genuine fact issue exists about the bar’s knowledge at time of service and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a genuine issue of material fact exists that Draught House 50 knew or should have known Campbell was intoxicated or would become intoxicated when served | Banwart: Campbell was intoxicated shortly after leaving the bar (officer observations, BAC .143, no further drinking, close temporal proximity), so a factfinder could infer the bar had scienter at time of service | Draught House 50: Three bottles over ~4 hours (per Campbell) without direct evidence of visible intoxication at time of service is insufficient to impute knowledge; summary judgment appropriate | Court: Reversed — viewing evidence favorably to Banwart, reasonable factfinder could infer scienter; summary judgment improper |
Key Cases Cited
- Smith v. Shagnasty's, Inc., 688 N.W.2d 67 (Iowa 2004) (subsequent-intoxication and the bar’s conduct can create a jury question on scienter under dramshop law)
- Fairbanks v. J.B. McLoughlin Co., 929 P.2d 433 (Wash. 1996) (officer observations shortly after leaving venue can support inference the patron was intoxicated at time of service if no intervening drinking or unaccounted time)
- Kalenka v. Jadon, Inc., 305 P.3d 346 (Alaska 2013) (circumstantial evidence of intoxication shortly after leaving a bar can preclude summary judgment)
- Alaniz v. Rebello Food & Beverage, L.L.C., 165 S.W.3d 7 (Tex. App. 2005) (temporal gap and intervening facts can defeat an inference that the provider knew of intoxication at time of service)