Rhoades, Dustin Ryan, PD-1350-15

Background

On June 7, 2012, Deans Anderson was found dead from a gunshot to the face in his Amarillo apartment; police traced a phone contact to an escort using the alias “Chocolate Cherry.”
Amarillo police ran an undercover prostitution sting; an officer participated in an offer/acceptance that led to the warrantless arrest of Cree‑Anna Dawn (the escort). Information obtained from Dawn after that arrest identified Dustin Rhoades as the man who accompanied her to Anderson’s door.
Rhoades was later arrested on a murder warrant and gave oral and written statements admitting he pointed a .357 revolver and that the gun discharged as Anderson stepped toward him; his girlfriend testified Rhoades told her the gun went off when Dawn pulled his arm.
At trial the State relied on two theories of murder: (1) intentional/knowing killing, and (2) felony‑murder predicated on deadly conduct (discharging a firearm or related dangerous act).
Rhoades moved to suppress identification and his statements under Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.23 (arguing evidence was the fruit of the illegal prostitution sting), moved to quash paragraph two of the indictment (challenging the felony‑murder allegation), and requested a jury instruction on voluntariness (claiming the discharge was involuntary). The trial court denied relief; a jury convicted and assessed 40 years.
The Seventh Court of Appeals affirmed in a memorandum opinion; Rhoades petitioned the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals for discretionary review raising standing under art. 38.23, sufficiency, indictment quash, and voluntariness instruction issues.

Issues

Issue	Rhoades' Argument	State's Argument	Held
1. Standing under art. 38.23 to suppress ID/statements obtained after undercover prostitution sting	Sting was criminal (prostitution) by officers; evidence identifying Rhoades and his statements were fruits of that illegality and should be excluded	Rhoades lacks third‑party standing because the illegal conduct invaded Dawn’s rights, not Rhoades’	Court of Appeals: Rhoades lacked standing; suppression denied and conviction affirmed
2. Sufficiency of paragraph two of the indictment (felony‑murder based on deadly conduct)	Paragraph two illogically alleges Deadly Conduct while committing Deadly Conduct (or points without specifying the felony act), making felony‑murder charge defective or effectively a manslaughter bootstrap	The indictment adequately alleged deadly conduct as the underlying felony/act clearly dangerous to human life; murderous theory cognizable	Court of Appeals: indictment was sufficient; motion to quash denied
3. Right to voluntariness instruction (accident/involuntary discharge)	Multiple accounts raised an involuntariness defense (flinch; arm grabbed/bumped); request for instruction should have been submitted	A voluntary preparatory act (carrying/pointing the gun) satisfies Tex. Penal Code §6.01(a); Farmer and precedent permit denial where a voluntary act is part of the conduct	Court of Appeals: no error in refusing the instruction because a voluntary act (pointing/bringing the gun) was part of the offense
4. Legal sufficiency of evidence for murder (intent/knowledge)	Only testimony supporting mens rea was Rhoades’ contemporaneous statements describing an involuntary reflex; no witness saw the shooting—evidence insufficient	Jury could credit Rhoades’ written confession that he pointed the gun and then ‘‘twisted and pulled the trigger’’; from those facts a rational jury could infer intent or knowledge	Court of Appeals: evidence sufficient under Jackson/Brooks; conviction affirmed

Key Cases Cited

Wilson v. State, 311 S.W.3d 452 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (Article 38.23 purpose: deter overreaching police conduct; exclusionary remedy for evidence obtained by illegal police acts)
Fuller v. State, 829 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (defendant lacks standing to challenge evidence obtained by illegality directed at third party)
Chavez v. State, 9 S.W.3d 817 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (standing principles for art. 38.23 challenges)
Farmer v. State, 411 S.W.3d 901 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (voluntariness: a voluntary act that is part of the conduct can preclude an involuntariness instruction)
Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (standard for reviewing legal sufficiency of the evidence)
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (U.S. 1979) (evidence sufficiency standard; view evidence in light most favorable to verdict)
Lawson v. State, 64 S.W.3d 396 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (felony‑murder cannot be predicated on manslaughter or a lesser‑included offense)