Reynolds v. State
423 S.W.3d 377
| Tex. Crim. App. | 2014Background
- Craig Rudy Reynolds was convicted in 1990 of sexual assault of a child, served his sentence, and was released in 1995; the original 1991 Texas sex-offender registration law did not require him to register.
- In 1997 the Legislature broadened Chapter 62 retroactively to convictions on or after Sept. 1, 1970, but an uncodified “savings clause” preserved exemptions for persons not confined or under supervision on Sept. 1, 1997 — a clause that left Reynolds exempt.
- In 2005 the Legislature reenacted and amended Chapter 62, repealing article 62.11 (which had accompanied the savings clause) and adding a transition clause stating the changes “apply to a person subject to Chapter 62…for an offense…before, on, or after” the effective date.
- Relying on DPS guidance that he did not have to register, Reynolds did not register; he was arrested in 2009, convicted for failure to register, and sentenced to five years.
- The court of appeals affirmed; Reynolds sought discretionary review raising (1) whether the 2005 amendments made him newly subject to registration and (2) whether applying the amendments to him would be unconstitutionally retroactive.
Issues
| Issue | Reynolds' Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether 2005 amendments made Reynolds (a 1990 convict released in 1995) subject to Chapter 62 registration | The transition clause limits application to persons already subject to Chapter 62 on enactment; the prior uncodified savings clause should remain in effect or at least not be impliedly repealed | The plain text and repeal of article 62.11 show the savings clause was removed; the 2005 transition clause applies to persons with reportable convictions (post-1970), so Reynolds is covered | Court held Chapter 62 applies to Reynolds; the 2005 amendments effectively deleted the savings clause and imposed the registration duty |
| Whether applying the 2005 amendments to Reynolds violates the Texas constitutional prohibition on retroactive laws | He had a vested right not to register; retroactive imposition of registration is unconstitutional (urged Robinson three-factor test) | Registration is regulatory (police power), not an impairment of a vested right; even under Robinson test the public interest justifies the change | Issue not considered on merits: Court held Reynolds failed to preserve the retroactivity claim at trial, so it is waived |
| Preservation: Whether Reynolds preserved his as-applied retroactivity challenge for appeal | (Argued on appeal he had raised statutory-applicability below) | State argued the retroactivity constitutional claim was not preserved and should be addressed (or remanded) | Court found no timely, specific trial objection on retroactivity; holding that the constitutional retroactivity claim was not preserved and therefore not reached |
| Sufficiency of evidence to rebut mistake-of-law affirmative defense | Reynolds argued jury should have found mistake of law | State argued there was evidence supporting jury rejection of the defense | Court of appeals had found some evidence supporting jury’s denial; Supreme Court affirmed overall judgment (did not disturb that factual conclusion) |
Key Cases Cited
- Ex parte Arce, 297 S.W.3d 279 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (discusses 1997 amendments and savings-clause issues)
- Ex parte Harbin, 297 S.W.3d 283 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (footnote concluding 2005 amendments effectively repealed uncodified savings clause)
- Robinson v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 335 S.W.3d 126 (Tex. 2010) (articulates three-factor test for unconstitutional retroactivity analysis)
- Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (statutory interpretation starts with text and legislative intent)
- Flores v. State, 245 S.W.3d 432 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (preservation requirement for as-applied constitutional claims)
- Ford v. State, 305 S.W.3d 530 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (appellate courts should address preservation questions; Court may do so on review)