Reynolds v. Clark, 322 Ga. App. 788

Underlying dispute: Clark sued Reynolds (and intervenor Any & All Metal Recycling) for conversion, replevin, and related claims arising from a business resale arrangement; jury returned verdicts for Clark on remaining claims but denied attorney fees.
While Clark’s appeal of the final judgment was pending, the trial court entered a post-judgment award of attorney fees under OCGA § 9-15-14; the original order was signed before the judge’s resignation but filed after his resignation and thus void.
On remand a different judge entered essentially the same attorney-fee order, awarding $44,320 jointly against Reynolds and the intervenor; Clark cross-appealed seeking inclusion of defense counsel in the prior (void) order.
The trial court’s fee order did not specify whether the award was under subsection (a) (frivolous claims) or (b) (lack of substantial justification/other improper conduct), nor did it identify the specific conduct supporting the award.
Fee evidence consisted of counsel’s time summary totaling $48,424.88; counsel failed to segregate time attributable to claims for which fees are recoverable versus other work and included time for an unsuccessful new-trial motion.
Court concluded the order lacked required findings and the fee proof was inadequate, vacating the award and remanding for reconsideration with directions.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether trial court properly awarded fees under OCGA § 9-15-14	Clark argued fees were warranted and previously awarded; award should stand	Reynolds/Intervenor challenged the fee award as unsupported and procedurally defective	Vacated and remanded because the order failed to state whether under (a) or (b) and did not identify conduct supporting the award
Whether the order must specify the subsection ((a) vs (b)) and conduct basis	Clark favored affirmance without further specification	Defendants argued lack of specification prevented meaningful review	Court required explicit statement of subsection and specific findings of conduct supporting fees
Whether counsel’s submitted fee evidence was sufficient	Clark relied on a total-hours summary and expense exhibit	Defendants argued the evidence failed to segregate recoverable from nonrecoverable time and included irrelevant work	Evidence was inadequate; trial court must have proof separating time attributable to fee‑recoverable claims and show reasonableness
Whether prior void order or omission of defense counsel affected relief	Clark argued omission of defense counsel in prior order was inadvertent and should be corrected	Defendants contended prior order was void and current order inadequate	Court held the prior untimely-filed order was void; remand required for proper findings and adequate fee proof

Woods v. Hall, 315 Ga. App. 93 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012) (trial court must state whether award is under OCGA § 9-15-14(a) or (b) and specify conduct supporting award)
Dave Lucas Co. v. Lewis, 293 Ga. App. 288 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (fee awards require sufficient proof of actual costs and reasonableness; allocation between recoverable and nonrecoverable time is necessary)
Citadel Corp. v. All-South Subcontractors, 217 Ga. App. 736 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (appellate court may remand where trial court failed to make required findings on fee entitlement)
Ga. Dept. of Transp. v. Douglas Asphalt Co., 295 Ga. App. 421 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (conclusory findings are insufficient to support OCGA § 9-15-14 awards)
Bankhead v. Moss, 210 Ga. App. 508 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993) (standard of review: any evidence supports subsection (a) award; subsection (b) reviewed for abuse of discretion)