Reyes v. Bonnar
362 F. Supp. 3d 762
N.D. Cal.2019Background
- Raul Lopez Reyes, a Guatemalan national detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), was denied bond by an IJ in Sept. 2017 based primarily on three DUI convictions and a then-felony assault; the BIA affirmed.
- Since that bond denial, Reyes completed phase one of a DEUCE treatment program, obtained an updated psychological evaluation finding sustained sobriety and amenability to treatment, and his 2008 felony assault was reduced to a misdemeanor.
- Reyes submitted a comprehensive post-release plan (inpatient treatment placement steps, mental-health providers, community and family support, transportation, and insurance enrollment) and numerous letters of support.
- The IJ denied Reyes’s request for a second bond hearing under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(e), concluding the new material did not show a material change and re-asserting dangerousness concerns.
- Reyes sought habeas relief and a temporary restraining order; the district court found the IJ legally erred in assessing material change and held due process (Mathews v. Eldridge) required a new bond hearing, granting a TRO ordering a bond hearing within 15 days.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether IJ legally erred in denying a second bond hearing under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(e) | Reyes: new psychological report, sustained sobriety, reduced felony, detailed post-release plan, and community support constitute a material change. | DHS/IJ: evidence is not materially different; persistent DUI history and facts showing dangerousness justify no new hearing. | Court: IJ legally erred by mischaracterizing prior testimony, failing to consider probative evidence, and applying the wrong standard; material change shown as a matter of law. |
| Whether due process requires an additional bond hearing (Mathews balancing) | Reyes: prolonged detention (22 months), material changes, and low burden/cost of another hearing weigh in favor of additional process. | DHS: government interest in detaining those dangerous to community and in efficient enforcement; Jennings limits statutory entitlement to periodic hearings. | Court: Mathews balance favors Reyes — strong private interest, relatively lesser governmental interest here, and high value added by an additional hearing; due process requires a new bond hearing. |
| Standard of proof at any required bond hearing | Reyes: if hearing required, government must bear burden and prove dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence (Singh). | DHS: Jennings limits statutory rights but does not necessarily displace constitutional burdens. | Court: Recognizes Singh rule remains controlling on due-process allocation of burden (government must prove dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence at hearing). |
| Appropriate remedy | Reyes: seeks immediate release or, alternatively, a new bond hearing. | DHS: opposes immediate release, contends continued detention lawful absent bond finding. | Court: Denies immediate release; grants TRO limited to ordering a new bond hearing within 15 days or release. |
Key Cases Cited
- Stuhlbarg Int'l Sales Co., Inc. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2001) (preliminary injunction/TRO standards compared).
- Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7 (2008) (elements required for preliminary injunction/TRO).
- Shell Offshore, Inc. v. Greenpeace, Inc., 709 F.3d 1281 (9th Cir. 2013) (alternative serious-questions standard discussed).
- Pimentel v. Dreyfus, 670 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2012) (sliding-scale approach for injunction factors).
- Prieto-Romero v. Clark, 534 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2008) (framework for immigration detention review).
- Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003) (limits on judicial review of discretionary detention decisions).
- Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2011) (government must prove dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence in bond hearings).
- Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (three-factor due-process balancing test).
- Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (liberty interests and limits on detention).
- Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d 252 (9th Cir. 2018) (freedom from imprisonment as core liberty interest).