Reyes Colon v. United States, 132 Fed. Cl. 655

Luis A. Reyes Colón, a retired service member, worked in South Korea for a U.S. company (Serco) after military retirement, then accepted a civilian Army position in South Korea and received LQA from Dec. 7, 2009 to May 1, 2014.
The Army audited LQA grants after DoD guidance concluded some locally hired employees had been improperly paid; the Army determined Reyes was ineligible under DSSR § 031.12(b) and ended future payments as of May 1, 2014.
OPM affirmed the Army’s view, finding (1) Serco had recruited Reyes outside the U.S. and (2) Serco did not provide return transportation as required by DSSR § 031.12(b).
Reyes sued in the Court of Federal Claims seeking LQA payments from May 1, 2014 forward; both parties moved for summary judgment.
The court found it had Tucker Act jurisdiction based on the combination of the Act, the DSSR, DoDI No. 1400.25, and the Army regulation (following Roberts) and then reviewed the Army’s interpretation of DSSR § 031.12 under Auer-style deference.
On the merits the court held Reyes failed to satisfy two independent statutory/regulatory prerequisites in DSSR § 031.12(b): he was not recruited in the United States by his prior employer (Serco) and Serco did not provide return transportation, so the Army’s ineligibility determination was not plainly erroneous; summary judgment for the government granted.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Jurisdiction to hear LQA claim	Reyes alleged he falls within class identified by Army regulation authorizing LQA; court has Tucker Act jurisdiction	Government argued DSSR/Act alone are money-authorizing, but DoD/Army implementing rules create money-mandating source	Court: jurisdiction exists under Roberts because DoDI and Army regulation combined with Act/DSSR are money-mandating
"Recruited in the United States" requirement (DSSR § 031.12(b))	Reyes contends he was a locally recruited employee eligible for LQA	Army/OPM: Reyes was employed and recruited by Serco while in South Korea, not recruited in the U.S.	Held: Reyes was recruited outside the U.S.; requirement not met
"Substantially continuous employment" and return transportation requirement	Reyes argued Army had provided return transportation on retirement and/or at appointment	Army/OPM: DSSR requires prior employer (Serco) to have provided return transportation during prior employment; Serco did not	Held: No evidence Serco provided return transportation; requirement not met, independently fatal to claim
Deference to agency interpretation of DSSR	Reyes challenged Army/OPM interpretation as incorrect	Government urged deference to Army interpretation because Army is authorized to implement DSSR	Held: Court defers to Army/OPM interpretation (Auer/Pauley reasoning) because the Army administers DSSR; interpretation not plainly erroneous

Roberts v. United States, 745 F.3d 1158 (Fed. Cir.) (holding Act+DSSR+DoD implementing rules can make payment mandatory for a defined class)
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997) (agency’s interpretation of its own regulation entitled to deference unless plainly erroneous)
United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983) (Tucker Act waives sovereign immunity for money claims but does not create substantive rights)
Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414 (1990) (equitable estoppel cannot create entitlement to money not authorized by law)
Acevedo v. United States, 824 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir.) (distinguishing facts where no agency-wide money-mandating implementing instruction existed)