Rey Garza v. Roxana Regalado Harrison and Joseph Santellana, Individually and as Respresentative of the Estate of Jonathen Anthony Santellana, 574 S.W.3d 389

Rey Garza, a commissioned Navasota police officer, worked off duty as a privately paid “courtesy patrol” for an apartment complex; complex policies purportedly restricted courtesy officers from acting as police.
While off duty and outside Navasota’s jurisdiction, Garza observed Jonathen Santellana allegedly possessing marijuana, returned to retrieve his service weapon, and attempted to effect a warrantless arrest; Santellana was shot and later died.
Santellana’s parents sued Garza individually (wrongful death) in state court; Garza moved to dismiss under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §101.106(f) (election-of-remedies) arguing the suit was effectively an official-capacity claim and must be dismissed or the city substituted.
The trial court denied dismissal, citing a fact issue whether Garza acted as a private security employee or a peace officer; the court of appeals affirmed but read §101.106(f) to apply only when an officer had a statutory duty (not merely authority) to act extraterritorially.
The Supreme Court of Texas granted review to resolve whether §101.106(f) covers an officer acting pursuant to statutorily conferred authority (even if action is discretionary) and whether Garza was therefore sued in his official capacity.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether §101.106(f) applies when a peace officer, off duty and outside primary jurisdiction, attempts a warrantless arrest under statutory authority	Garza acted as private courtesy patrol; the apartment contract and policies (and lack of employer directive) show he was not acting within the scope of his police employment; court of appeals: authority alone is insufficient absent a duty to act	Garza: peace-officer duties include statutorily conferred authority to arrest (articles 2.13, 6.06, 14.03); scope-of-employment focuses on whether he was doing his job, not whether he was obligated to act	The Court held §101.106(f) applies: an officer acting under a statutory grant of authority to make a warrantless arrest is acting within the general scope of employment as a matter of law; dismissal required because Garza was sued in his official capacity
Whether private contractual restrictions (courtesy-patrol policies) or estoppel/waiver preclude §101.106(f) dismissal	Plaintiffs argued Garza’s private agreement to refrain from acting as an officer should prevent him from invoking §101.106(f)	Garza argued those defenses were waived and, in any event, a private contract cannot negate public duties derived from a commission	Court rejected these defenses as waived on appeal and unpersuasive as a matter of public policy; private contracts cannot nullify statutory authority or oaths

Laverie v. Wetherbe, 517 S.W.3d 748 (Tex. 2017) (scope-of-employment test: objective connection between job duties and alleged tortious conduct)
Franka v. Velasquez, 332 S.W.3d 367 (Tex. 2011) (§101.106(f) forces election and treats official-capacity suits as suits against the governmental unit)
Tex. Adjutant Gen.’s Office v. Ngakoue, 408 S.W.3d 350 (Tex. 2013) (statutory construction principles regarding the Tort Claims Act)
City of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. 1994) (official-immunity framework and discretionary duties)
Blackwell v. Harris County, 909 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, writ denied) (distinguishes private-capacity acts for private employers from enforcement of general laws)