Rew ex rel. T.C.B. v. Bergstrom
2014 Minn. LEXIS 201
| Minn. | 2014Background
- Bergstrom and Rew divorced after 14 years of marriage; Rew obtained multiple one-year OFPs in 2002, 2007, 2008 protecting herself and two minor children, with proximity and contact restrictions.
- The 2008 OFP included restrictions on Bergstrom’s contact with Rew and the children, and parenting-time conditions requiring therapy; Bergstrom consented to the 2008 OFP as if there were a finding of domestic abuse.
- In 2010, the district court extended the 2008 OFP for up to 50 years under Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 6a, citing Bergstrom’s prior OFP violations and recent incarceration.
- The district court also imposed extended restrictions (120-yard buffers around Rew’s residence, workplace, church; 50-yard public buffer; continued parenting-time suspension pending therapy) and relied on Bergstrom’s prior conduct and convictions rather than new testimony.
- Bergstrom challenged the extension via Rule 60.02 and asserted constitutional violations; the court of appeals affirmed some rulings and remanded for findings on speech burdens; the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for additional findings regarding First Amendment limits as to restrictions on the children.
- Justice Stras’s lead opinion concludes that the statute does not require a domestic-abuse finding for extensions and that the First Amendment analysis supports upholding the Rew-related restrictions, but remands for specific findings regarding the restrictions on the minor children.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether 518B.01, 6a, requires a domestic-abuse finding to extend OFPs | Bergstrom argues the statute requires a domestic-abuse finding for extensions | Rew argues the statute's plain language does not require a domestic-abuse finding for extensions | No; statute does not require a domestic-abuse finding for extensions |
| Whether 518B.01, 6a(b) (up to 50 years) is constitutional under First Amendment | Bergstrom contends the 50-year extension burdens speech more than necessary | Rew defends statute as a permissible content-neutral, significant-interest measure | Statute is constitutional; extension up to 50 years upheld with need for tailored findings on children on remand |
| Whether the extended OFP violates procedural due process | Bergstrom claims inadequate process and exclusion of evidence at hearings | State argues procedures (notice, hearing, impartial judge) are sufficient | Procedural due process not violated; procedures adequate under Mathews factors; no additional safeguards required |
| Whether the extension violates ex post facto protections | Extension applied to past conduct; argues it retroactively punishes | Statute creates civil remedy; not a criminal penalty | No ex post facto violation; extended OFP Civil remedy under Mendoza-Martinez factors |
| Whether the extension violates double jeopardy | Extended OFP punishes for prior OFP violations | Protection not a government prosecution; private-party OFP does not trigger double jeopardy | No double jeopardy violation under dual-sovereignty approach; private-party suit not subject to double jeopardy |
Key Cases Cited
- Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 758 (U.S. 1994) (content-neutral injunctions burden no more speech than necessary to serve significant government interests)
- Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (U.S. 1963) (Kennedy-Mendoza-Martinez factors used to classify civil vs. criminal penalties)
- Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (U.S. 2003) (ex post facto analysis; civil vs. criminal remedy considerations)
- Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (U.S. 2000) (limitations on speech in certain contexts; framework for content-neutral restrictions)
- Premier Bank v. Becker Dev., LLC, 785 N.W.2d 753 (Minn. 2010) (state statutory interpretation and limits on adding words to statute)