Retail Property Trust v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America
200 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3653
| 9th Cir. | 2014Background
- Retail Property Trust (RPT) owns Brea Mall. United Brotherhood of Carpenters Local 803 (the Union) protested a tenant’s use of non‑union subcontractors in October 2010, allegedly engaging in loud, disruptive conduct on the Mall’s private common areas and violating the Mall’s time, place, and manner rules.
- RPT sued in California state court for trespass, private nuisance, and injunctive relief under Cal. Labor Code § 1138.1; the Union removed to federal court asserting federal jurisdiction under § 303 of the LMRA (29 U.S.C. § 187) and arguing preemption.
- The district court treated the state tort claims as completely preempted by § 303 and dismissed them; RPT later amended its complaint and pleaded § 303 jurisdiction, then voluntarily dismissed its § 303 claim and appealed the dismissal of the state claims.
- The Ninth Circuit framed the dispute as whether § 303 (secondary‑boycott provisions) preempts state trespass and nuisance claims arising from union conduct that might also constitute secondary boycott activity.
- The court reviewed preemption doctrines (complete preemption, Garmon primary‑jurisdiction preemption, and Machinists/Morton conflict/field preemption) and examined whether the Mall’s property‑based tort claims intrude on federal labor policy.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 303 completely preempts state trespass and nuisance claims related to alleged secondary boycott conduct | RPT: State tort claims are independent property‑based claims enforcing time, place, and manner rules and therefore not wholly preempted by § 303 | Union: § 303 (via § 158(b)(4)) completely preempts state claims and authorizes removal to federal court | No—§ 303 does not completely occupy the field; complete‑preemption/removal characterization was incorrect here |
| Whether Morton/Machinists preemption (conflict/field) bars state tort suits for conduct overlapping with secondary boycotts | RPT: Trespass/nuisance touch local property interests and regulate manner/location, not union objectives, so they do not frustrate NLRA policy | Union: Allowing state tort remedies would frustrate federal labor objectives and permit circumvention of § 303’s scheme | Court: Under Morton/Machinists and Sears, state torts addressing local property/public‑order interests (time/place/manner, violent or disorderly conduct) are not preempted here |
| Whether Garmon primary‑jurisdiction preemption requires NLRB exclusive resolution before state courts may adjudicate | RPT: The Mall’s claims are not subject to NLRB primary jurisdiction because they challenge property invasion/location, not substantive labor rights | Union: Some conduct arguably falls within § 7/§ 8, implicating NLRB jurisdiction | Court: Garmon is not implicated; Sears and Morton principles control and permit state jurisdiction over local property torts when Board jurisdiction would not resolve the same controversy |
| Whether district court’s removal and dismissal rulings should be upheld | RPT: Removal was improper and dismissal of state claims was erroneous | Union: Removal and dismissal were proper under Smart and complete‑preemption reasoning | Court: District court erred to the extent it treated § 303 as completely preempting state torts; remanded for adjudication of state claims (district court’s dismissal of § 303 claim affirmed) |
Key Cases Cited
- San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) (preempts state regulation when activity is "arguably" protected or prohibited by NLRA and NLRB has primary jurisdiction)
- Local 20, Teamsters v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252 (1964) (§ 303 displaces state damages actions based on peaceful secondary boycott activity, but state law may address violence or threats to public order)
- Lodge 76, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Emp. Relations Comm’n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976) (states may not regulate areas Congress intended to leave to economic self‑help; Morton/Machinists preemption analysis)
- Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Cnty. Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 (1978) (state trespass/nuisance suits may proceed where they address local property/public‑order interests distinct from NLRB issues)
- Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987) (complete‑preemption doctrine converts certain state claims into federal ones for removal jurisdiction)
- Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987) (well‑pleaded complaint rule: federal defenses, including preemption, do not create removal jurisdiction)