Resurrection Bay Conservation Alliance v. City of Seward
640 F.3d 1087
9th Cir.2011Background
- RBCA filed a citizen enforcement suit under the Clean Water Act alleging the City of Seward discharged pollutants from the Small Boat Harbor and SMIC into Resurrection Bay without an NPDES permit.
- District court granted partial summary judgment finding the City is an operator discharging stormwater and required permit application; it denied civil penalties and a fee award to RBCA.
- EPA later concluded no NPDES permit was required for the Small Boat Harbor, and the matter was remanded.
- On remand, the district court held RBCA prevailing but denied attorney fees under a finding of “special circumstances,” citing limited relief, lack of pollution evidence, lack of economic benefit to the City, and unchanged behavior.
- RBCA appealed; Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded to determine prevailing party status and the appropriateness of fees; the current decision vacates the district court’s denial of fees and remands for fee award.
- Costs on appeal are awarded to RBCA.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether special circumstances support denying attorney fees under 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d). | RBCA contends special circumstances were not shown. | City argues district court correctly found special circumstances to unjustly award fees. | Special circumstances not supported; abuse of discretion; fees should be awarded. |
| Whether the district court properly weighed the CWA permit objectives in denying fees. | RBCA emphasizes permit-process goals and relief achieved. | City emphasizes limited relief and EPA advisory context. | District court misapplied law; permit framework and CWA goals support fee award. |
Key Cases Cited
- Saint John's Organic Farm v. Gem County Mosquito Abatement District, 574 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 2009) (defines 'special circumstances' and favors fee awards; guides abuse standard)
- Borunda v. Richmond, 885 F.2d 1384 (9th Cir. 1988) (special circumstances can deny fees in extreme cases)
- Ackerley Communications, Inc. v. City of Salem, 752 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1985) (lists factors showing what does not qualify as special circumstances)
- Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc. v. Jensen, 390 U.S. 400 (Supreme Court 1968) (origin of 'special circumstances' standard (per curiam))
- Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1975) (Kerr factors for attorney fee reasonableness)
- Saint John's Organic Farm v. Gem County Mosquito Abatement District, 574 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 2009) (reiterates narrow application of 'special circumstances')
- Tyler v. Corner Construction Corp., Inc., 167 F.3d 1202 (8th Cir. 1999) (example of outcomes under special circumstances)
- Stewart v. Donges, 979 F.2d 179 (10th Cir. 1992) (illustrates varying approaches to fee denial)
- Lewis v. Kendrick, 944 F.2d 949 (1st Cir. 1991) (discusses factors relevant to fee requests)
- Robins v. Harum, 773 F.2d 1004 (9th Cir. 1985) (fee denial on appeal for inadequately briefed issues)
- Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992) (critical factor: degree of success in fee determinations)
- Teitelbaum v. Sorenson, 648 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1981) (limits on considering defendant good faith as special circumstance)
- Russian River Watershed Protection Committee v. City of Santa Rosa, 142 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 1998) (explains relationship between CWA permit requirements and relief)