Reshard v. Stevenson, 270 A.3d 274

Background

Landlord Barbara Stevenson served tenant Connie Reshard a 90-day notice and filed a personal-use eviction complaint; an initial hearing was scheduled for February 8, 2018.
Reshard moved for a continuance to obtain counsel but did not appear at the February 8 hearing; Judge Johnson denied the continuance and entered a default judgment (later docketed as final after SCRA affidavit was filed).
Four days later Reshard filed a motion under Super. Ct. Civ. R. 60(b) to set aside the default; she also sought stays of the writ of restitution but those stays were denied and the eviction was executed on May 11, 2018.
On August 28 Judge Johnson denied Reshard’s Rule 60(b) motion in a brief three-page order citing her litigation history, lack of counsel, and the eviction; he did not explicitly analyze the Starling factors for Rule 60(b)(1).
Reshard appealed; the D.C. Court of Appeals held the trial court’s consideration was too cursory, identified multiple Rule 60(b) theories (1, 3, 4) to be addressed, and vacated the denial and remanded for a fuller inquiry.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Adequacy of trial court’s inquiry under Rule 60(b)(1) (Starling factors)	Reshard: court failed to apply Starling factors; she acted promptly and had potentially meritorious defenses (e.g., landlord’s lack of intent to occupy; waiver by rent).	Stevenson: Reshard had history of dilatory requests, lacked counsel, and eviction makes vacatur prejudicial; courts typically decline to vacate post-eviction absent defective service.	Trial court’s inquiry was too cursory; remand required to evaluate all Starling factors, defenses, and prejudice properly.
Claims of opposing counsel misrepresentation under Rule 60(b)(3)	Reshard: counsel misrepresented her litigation history and counsel status at the February hearing; transcript later undermined those statements.	Stevenson: denies any agreement to delay writ and denies misrepresentations.	Court must address alleged misrepresentations on remand; trial court failed to inquire into (60)(3) contentions.
Void-judgment/service defects under Rule 60(b)(4)	Reshard: process affidavit was filed only three days before hearing; notice-to-quit posting may have been defective.	Stevenson: service of process was legally effective; timing of affidavit did not void service.	Trial court correctly found service adequate as to process; whether notice-to-quit service was proper may raise factual issues for the trial court to resolve on remand.
Effect of eviction/prejudice on vacatur	Reshard: sought relief promptly and repeatedly; prejudice argument overstates landlord harm and ignores alternative remedies.	Stevenson: eviction and subsequent change in status make vacatur prejudicial and justify denial.	Prejudice must be analyzed in terms of prejudice from reopening the case (not hypothetical results); trial court misstated/overemphasized finality and must reassess prejudice on remand.

Key Cases Cited

Nuyen v. Luna, 884 A.2d 650 (D.C. 2005) (treatment of motions construed as Rule 60(b) and appellate scope)
Wylie v. Glenncrest, 143 A.3d 73 (D.C. 2016) (importance of adequate inquiry when tenant seeks relief from default)
Starling v. Jephunneh Lawrence & Assocs., 495 A.2d 1157 (D.C. 1985) (trial court’s duty to inquire where Rule 60(b) relief may be warranted)
Walker v. Smith, 499 A.2d 446 (D.C. 1985) (balancing finality against right to be heard in defaults)
Brown v. Kone, Inc., 841 A.2d 331 (D.C. 2004) (abuse-of-discretion review of Rule 60(b)(1) denials)
Carrasco v. Thomas D. Walsh, Inc., 988 A.2d 471 (D.C. 2010) (prejudice analysis when tenants seek to vacate defaults after eviction)
King v. Berindoague, 928 A.2d 693 (D.C. 2007) (landlord’s intent to occupy relevant to personal-use eviction claims)