Reoforce, Inc. v. United States, 853 F.3d 1249

Theodore Simonson (later Reoforce, Inc.) located pumicite mining claims in Kern County, CA in the 1980s and developed lab tests and limited commercial interest suggesting potential industrial uses for the mineral.
BLM conditionally approved a 1987 Plan of Operations, later found the mineral an "uncommon variety" (1989) but reserved the question of economic value; Reoforce mined only ~200 tons total and sold 5 tons before 1995.
In 1995 BLM sent an MOU with California Parks as part of a land transfer process; the MOU categorized claims into groups and, depending on group, either allowed interim mining or required suspension pending a validity determination.
BLM initiated a validity determination (2004–2006) and the mineral examiner concluded Reoforce pumicite was not a valuable, marketable mineral under the General Mining Law; the Department commenced a contest and settled in 2008, with Reoforce relinquishing most claims and retaining conditional rights on three claims (subject to timely mining).
Reoforce sued in the Court of Federal Claims in 2011 alleging a temporary regulatory taking from 1995–2008 based on the MOU; the Claims Court found no standing and on the merits ruled no compensable taking. On appeal the Federal Circuit held Reoforce had standing and that the claim was not time-barred, but affirmed the merits judgment for the Government.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Standing	Reoforce contended it suffered a concrete injury from the MOU and could sue	Government argued Reoforce relinquished rights before suit and thus lacked standing	Court: Reoforce has Article III standing; post-taking relinquishment does not strip standing
Statute of limitations (28 U.S.C. §2501)	Claim accrued when validity determination settled in 2008, so suit (2011) timely	If claim accrued in 1995 with MOU, suit is time-barred	Court: Claim did not ripen until final agency action in 2008; statute did not bar suit
Whether MOU actually prohibited mining (factual)	MOU and some BLM communications placed Reoforce in Group Two, requiring suspension	Government: contemporaneous BLM communications and Reoforce conduct show mining was not prohibited; any suspension applied differently	Court: factual finding affirmed—no clear error; MOU did not, in fact, bar Reoforce from mining
Compensable regulatory taking under Penn Central	Reoforce: prolonged interference (1995–2008) deprived it of economically viable use and investment-backed expectations	Government: Reoforce was far from commercial production, industry highly regulated, and economic impact speculative	Court: Even if MOU restricted mining, Penn Central factors (economic impact, investment-backed expectations, character of action) weigh against finding a compensable taking; judgment for Government affirmed

United States v. Coleman, 390 U.S. 599 (superseding discussion of the prudent-man test for mineral value)
United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84 (recognizing exclusive possession rights from claim location)
Best v. Humboldt Placer Min. Co., 371 U.S. 334 (unpatented claims as conditional property and scope of Secretary of Interior authority)
Kunkes v. United States, 78 F.3d 1549 (unpatented mining claims are property protected by the Fifth Amendment)
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (multi-factor framework for regulatory takings)
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (temporary moratoria and takings analysis)
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (character-of-action inquiry and rejection of means-ends test)
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (temporary takings require compensation when regulation entirely deprives use)
Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (ripeness principles for takings claims and requirement of final agency decision)
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (notice of regulation and takings rights)
Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. United States, 559 F.3d 1260 (application of Penn Central and character-of-burden analysis)
Wyatt v. United States, 271 F.3d 1090 (owner must have property interest at time of taking for compensation)
Cienega Gardens v. United States, 331 F.3d 1319 (property interest requirement for takings claims)