Renewable Fuels Association v. EPA, 948 F.3d 1206

Background

Congress amended the Clean Air Act (Energy Policy Act 2005; Energy Independence and Security Act 2007) to impose increasing Renewable Fuel Standards (RFS) and created a temporary small-refinery exemption (through 2010) that could be extended for two years if DOE found "disproportionate economic hardship," and which allowed case-by-case EPA petitions “at any time.”
EPA regulations implemented RVOs, RINs, and a small-refinery petition process; in 2014 EPA revised the regulatory definition of "small refinery" to reference recent-year throughput.
Between 2016–2018 EPA began granting many more small-refinery exemption-extension petitions, substantially increasing exempted gallons/RINs and creating sizable carryover RIN pools.
Three refineries (Cheyenne, Woods Cross, Wynnewood) submitted hardship-extension petitions for 2016–2017; EPA granted all three in unpublished orders and in at least two instances reinstated or replaced retired RINs.
A coalition of biofuel interests (RFA, ACE, NFU, NCGA — the Biofuels Coalition) sued, arguing EPA exceeded statutory authority and acted arbitrarily and capriciously; EPA and intervening refineries defended the grants and raised jurisdictional defenses.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Standing	Biofuels Coalition: members suffered economic injury (lower prices/revenues; competition) fairly traceable to EPA grants; relief would at least partially redress harm.	Refineries: causal link and redressability are too attenuated; carryover RINs and market factors break traceability; timeliness/preclusion arguments.	Court: Coalition has standing—economic and competitor injuries sufficiently concrete, traceable, and likely partially redressable.
Timeliness / 60-day rule	Coalition: EPA never published the orders in Federal Register, so §7607(b)(1) 60-day clock never started; parties without notice should not be time-barred.	Refineries: 40 C.F.R. §23.3 makes non-Federal-Register actions final two weeks after signing; Coalition’s suit is untimely.	Court: Statutory clock did not start because orders were not published; §23.3 does not preclude third parties without notice.
Statutory meaning of "extension" (§7545(o)(9))	Coalition: "extension" means prolonging an existing exemption; EPA exceeded authority by granting extensions to refineries that had no prior exemption to extend.	EPA/Refineries: petition may be brought "at any time" so extensions can be granted broadly; 2014 rule on small-refinery definition supports EPA.	Court: "Extension" requires a prior exemption to extend; EPA exceeded statutory authority for the three grants where no prior exemption existed (or it had lapsed). 2014 regulatory rule does not resolve the extension question nor deprive this court of jurisdiction.
Arbitrary/Capricious analysis (pass-through of RIN costs)	Coalition: EPA ignored or failed to address prior agency findings/studies showing merchant (non-integrated) refiners typically pass RIN costs through to customers; EPA failed to analyze recoupment for these refineries.	EPA/Refineries: EPA may consider refinery-specific factors; Burkholder/other studies are general and not dispositive for individual petitions.	Court: Most EPA economic judgments sustained under APA deferential review, but EPA acted arbitrarily by failing to address or explain applicability of its own pass-through findings (Burkholder and related work), especially where a petitioner raised the issue.

Key Cases Cited

Sinclair Wyo. Refin. Co. v. EPA, 887 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 2017) (limits on EPA interpretations of "disproportionate economic hardship"; informal adjudications receive Skidmore weight)
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (standing analysis in environmental/regulatory context; small incremental regulatory steps can be redressable)
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (two-step framework for reviewing agency statutory interpretations)
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) (weight of agency interpretations depends on persuasiveness)
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (Article III standing elements)
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (arbitrary and capricious standard for agency action)
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 139 S. Ct. 361 (2018) (presumption of judicial review of agency action under the APA)
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (limits of Chevron; circumstances for Mead/Skidmore deference)
Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117 (2016) (agency may change policy but must provide reasoned explanation)
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S. 502 (2009) (requirements for reasoned explanation when agency changes course)