Reina-Rodriguez v. United States
655 F.3d 1182
9th Cir.2011Background
- Reina-Rodriguez pled guilty to illegal re-entry after deportation; district court applied a 16-level enhancement for a Utah burglary conviction deemed a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2.
- The district court relied on sua sponte public Utah property records to classify the burglary as a dwelling, sentencing him to 51 months plus supervised release and a $100 assessment.
- On direct appeal, the Ninth Circuit initially held Utah burglary of a dwelling categorically satisfies the guideline, applying Taylor’s categorical approach.
- Grisel (en banc) later overruled that view, requiring a modified categorical approach and narrowing what counts as a dwelling, thereby overruling the prior Reina-Rodriguez panel decision.
- Reina-Rodriguez moved under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 seeking retroactive application of Grisel; the district court denied, and the district court order was appealed.
- The Ninth Circuit holds Grisel applies retroactively to Reina-Rodriguez, Teague does not bar retroactive application, and the sentence must be resentenced on an open record.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Grisel applies retroactively under Teague. | Grisel is retroactive. | Teague bars retroactivity. | Teague does not bar retroactive application of Grisel. |
| Whether Grisel is a substantive rule rather than procedural for Teague purposes. | Grisel is a substantive narrowing of the statute. | Grisel is procedural in effect. | Grisel is a substantive rule; Teague does not apply. |
| Whether the Utah burglary of a dwelling qualifies categorically under Grisel. | Utah burglary of a dwelling fits the categorical definition. | Does not categorically qualify after Grisel. | Does not categorically qualify as a dwelling under the Guidelines. |
| Whether the record supports using the Utah conviction under the modified categorical approach. | Documents show the conviction fits the qualifying offense. | Documents insufficient to show the elements of the generic crime. | Record insufficient; cannot affirm under modified categorical approach. |
| Whether the district court erred by relying on sua sponte public property records. | District court may consider reliable records. | Such records cannot be used in a modified categorical analysis. | District court erred in considering those records. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Grisel, 488 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 2007) (overruled Reina-Rodriguez on dwelling scope; substantive rule; requires modified categorical approach)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (U.S. 1990) (categorical and modified categorical approaches to burglary dwelling)
- Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (S. Ct. 2005) (limits evidence for modified categorical analysis to record of conviction)
- Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (U.S. 1989) (retroactivity bar for new constitutional rules in collateral review)
- Rivera-Sanchez, 247 F.3d 905 (9th Cir. 2001) (threshold for modified categorical approach to predicate offenses)
- Casarez-Bravo, 181 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 1999) (elements-based approach in predicate analysis)
- Narvaez-Gomez, 489 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 2007) (application of modified categorical approach after Grisel)
- Espinoza-Morales, 621 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 2010) (explains categorical vs. modified approach in § 2L1.2)