Reilly v. Reilly
2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 13574
| Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | 2012Background
- Mediation led to a Marital and Property Settlement Agreement (MSA) incorporated into a Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage.
- A roofing dispute arose; lien was filed and later reduced to $4,500 paid by the former wife prior to sale of the marital home.
- The former wife moved for contempt to compel payment of four claims and her attorneys’ fees; two claims were resolved before the hearing.
- The trial court ordered $15,177 as equitable distribution from the sale, denied half the roofing expense, and denied attorneys’ fees because each side won one issue.
- MSA requires sale of the marital home and equal responsibility for home-related expenses, with disputes about the roof to be resolved at closing.
- Appellate rulings: roofing-half reversed in favor of wife; equitable-distribution amount affirmed; attorneys’ fees reversed and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is husband responsible for half of the roofing expense ($4,500)? | Reilly argues parties share home expenses equally per the MSA. | Reilly contends the roof issue did not obligate a split at closing. | Husband liable for half of $4,500; trial court's contrary ruling reversed. |
| Whether $15,177 must be paid as equitable distribution from closing proceeds | Reilly contends the payment is mandated by the MSA regardless of closing proceeds. | Reilly argues proceeds were not enough and source of funds matters. | Order for $15,177 as equitable distribution affirmed; source (closing proceeds) not a condition precedent. |
| Whether the MSA attorneys’ fees provision permits an award to the wife | Reilly seeks fees under the default/enforcement provision. | Reilly contends fees are mutual or not warranted due to partial success. | Remand for an award of the wife’s attorneys’ fees under the MSA; wife prevailed on all issues after reversal on roofing. |
| Is the $15,177 payment a condition precedent or a source issue | Reilly asserts it is a conditional obligation tied to closing proceeds. | Reilly argues it is a fixed equitable-distribution amount, not a condition precedent. | Payment is a fixed equitable-distribution amount; no condition precedent requiring closing-proceeds funding. |
Key Cases Cited
- Chipman v. Chipman, 975 So.2d 603 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (conditions precedent are disfavored; look to contract intent)
- In re Estate of Boyar, 592 So.2d 341 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (analysis of conditions precedent and covenant vs. condition)
- Kipp v. Kipp, 844 So.2d 691 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (de novo review of contract interpretation; avoid absurd result)
- Coe v. Abdo, 790 So.2d 1276 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (contract interpretation for marital settlements applied as law)