390 F. Supp. 3d 201
D.D.C.2019Background
- Plaintiffs (a certified class of noncitizens detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) at least six months in MA/NH without an individualized bond hearing) challenged mandatory categorical detention as violating the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment Excessive Bail Clause.
- Procedural posture: earlier district judgment in Plaintiffs’ favor (including a six‑month rule) was vacated on appeal after the First Circuit adopted an individualized reasonableness test; the Supreme Court’s decision in Jennings rejected reading a six‑month bond requirement into § 1226(c) but left the constitutional question open. Case returned for summary judgment briefing and limited discovery on detention durations and class members’ criminal histories.
- The Government conceded that § 1226(c) detention may violate due process when it becomes unreasonably prolonged but defended individualized adjudication and argued immigration courts lack authority to decide the constitutional issue for class members.
- The record shows most § 1226(c) agency proceedings conclude within a year; agency goals/regulations target completion well under one year, and a small percentage (~5.8% in sampled districts) exceed one year at the agency level.
- Class composition is mixed: some members have minor, nonviolent convictions; others have serious, violent criminal histories; when provided bond hearings under the 2014 injunction, roughly half of class members were denied release and the rest released on bond or supervision.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether mandatory § 1226(c) detention without a bond hearing violates due process when prolonged | Reid: categorical detention becomes unconstitutional after a defined period (ask for 6‑month rule) | Gov: statute mandates detention; only individualized habeas challenges in federal court; immigration courts lack authority to adjudicate constitutional challenges | Court: Due process violated when detention is unreasonably prolonged; adopts individualized, fact‑specific test (not a 6‑month bright line) |
| Proper temporal metric for “unreasonably prolonged” detention | Reid: six months is the outer limit (automatic bond) | Gov: no bright line; context and delays (including appeals) matter | Court: most important factor is length of detention; presumes detention likely unreasonable if >1 year at agency (excluding detainee‑caused delay); shorter periods may also be unreasonable depending on facts |
| Forum and procedure for challenging prolonged mandatory detention | Reid: require agency reasonableness hearings / bond hearings for class members | Gov: detainees must bring individual habeas petitions in federal court; immigration courts lack jurisdiction to rule on statute’s constitutionality | Court: detainee must bring individual habeas in federal court to obtain ruling that detention is unreasonably prolonged; if successful, immigration judge must hold bond hearing |
| Burden and standard of proof at bond hearings once detention deemed unreasonable | Reid: Government must bear burden, prove dangerousness/flight risk by clear and convincing evidence | Gov: agency precedent and statutes leave burden on detainee; burden should remain with alien | Court: Government bears burden; must prove dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence and risk of flight by a preponderance; immigration judges must consider ability to pay and less restrictive conditions; Eighth Amendment prohibits excessive bail but does not guarantee bail in all cases |
Key Cases Cited
- Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003) (upholding mandatory detention under § 1226(c) for the brief period necessary to complete removal proceedings)
- Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018) (statute unambiguously mandates detention under § 1226(c); rejected reading a six‑month bond requirement into the statute)
- Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (read a reasonableness limitation into post‑removal detention and adopted a six‑month presumptively reasonable period)
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (flexible, fact‑specific speedy‑process analysis informing reasonableness inquiries)
- Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (clear and convincing evidence required in certain civil commitment contexts)
- Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992) (civil detention implicates due process protections)
- United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (upholding pretrial preventive detention under strong procedural safeguards)
- Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954 (2019) (clarified timing for triggering § 1226(c) custody; did not resolve constitutionality of prolonged detention)
- Sopo v. United States Attorney General, 825 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 2016) (circuit precedent endorsing individualized reasonableness test)