Reichenbach v. Haydock, 90 N.E.3d 791

Background

Plaintiffs Margaret and John Reichenbach bought an oceanfront lot in 2008 and proposed demolishing the existing house and building a new home, triggering permit and wetlands processes.
Neighbors Timothy Haydock and Barbara Moss (defendants) repeatedly petitioned local and state authorities (conservation commission, DEP, zoning appeals, etc.) to oppose the project and also engaged in alleged nonpetitioning conduct (removing survey stakes, blocking contractors, trespass, harassment, threats, interference with utilities and access).
Plaintiffs sued in 2015 asserting, among other claims, a Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (MCRA), G. L. c. 12, §§ 11H & 11I, claim that the defendants’ course of conduct amounted to threats, intimidation, or coercion depriving plaintiffs of their property rights.
Defendants filed a special motion to dismiss under the anti‑SLAPP statute, G. L. c. 231, § 59H, arguing the MCRA claim was based solely on protected petitioning activity.
The Superior Court denied the special motion, finding defendants had not shown the MCRA claim was based only on petitioning; the judge held plaintiffs had pleaded a course of conduct that included nonpetitioning acts causing injury.
On interlocutory appeal, the Appeals Court applied Blanchard’s clarification of the Duracraft framework and affirmed the denial, holding the MCRA claim was based on the aggregate course of conduct and not solely on petitioning activity.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the MCRA claim is subject to dismissal under the anti‑SLAPP statute because it is based solely on defendants’ petitioning activity	Reichenbachs: claim rests on combined petitioning and nonpetitioning acts amounting to threats, intimidation, or coercion; not solely petitioning	Haydock & Moss: many alleged acts were petitions to government and thus protected; the MCRA count is based on that petitioning and should be dismissed under § 59H	Denied: the court held the MCRA claim is premised on a course of conduct that includes substantial nonpetitioning bases and therefore is not based solely on petitioning activity
Whether Blanchard (decided after the trial judge’s ruling) should apply on appeal	Reichenbachs: Blanchard interprets statutory framework and applies to this appeal	Defendants: timing of Blanchard does not preclude its application	Held: Blanchard applies; its stage‑one guidance governs analysis on appeal
Whether allegations that mix petitioning and nonpetitioning acts must be parsed such that petitioning acts are analyzed separately for § 59H purposes	Reichenbachs: because MCRA typically rests on aggregate course of conduct, the acts should not be parsed; claim can stand on the cumulative nonpetitioning conduct	Defendants: mixed allegations can be separated; petitioning acts should be treated as the sole basis where possible	Held: Court follows Blanchard—if individual acts can independently support the cause of action they may be parsed, but here MCRA is a course‑of‑conduct claim and the nonpetitioning acts collectively supply a substantial nonpetitioning basis

Key Cases Cited

Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Prods. Corp., 427 Mass. 156 (framework for anti‑SLAPP threshold analysis)
Blanchard v. Steward Carney Hosp., Inc., 477 Mass. 141 (clarifies and supplements Duracraft stage‑one analysis and offers alternate second‑stage showing)
Office One, Inc. v. Lopez, 437 Mass. 113 (describes Duracraft burden at stage one)
477 Harrison Ave., LLC v. JACE Boston, LLC, 477 Mass. 162 (applies Blanchard principles to distinguish course‑of‑conduct claims)
Ayasli v. Armstrong, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 740 (upheld denial of anti‑SLAPP where nonpetitioning interference supported MCRA claim)
Haufler v. Zotos, 446 Mass. 489 (pattern of persistent conduct can satisfy MCRA)
Garabedian v. Westland, 59 Mass. App. Ct. 427 (distinguished petitioning from private, nonpetitioning harassment)
Fabre v. Walton, 436 Mass. 517 (interlocutory appeal doctrine for denial of anti‑SLAPP motion)