Redmond v. Bank of New York Mellon Corporation
697 F. App'x 23
| 2d Cir. | 2017Background
- Plaintiffs Philip and Beverly Redmond sued Bank of New York Mellon and Nationstar after a 2009 Delaware foreclosure on their property, seeking declaratory relief, damages for slander of title, and federal claims under TILA/related statutes and state-law constructive fraud.
- The district court dismissed their complaint; plaintiffs appealed to the Second Circuit.
- Plaintiffs sought (inter alia) a declaration they owned the property free and clear and damages stemming from the foreclosure process, alleging defendants lacked proper interest/standing to foreclose.
- Plaintiffs also alleged statutory violations under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1640/1641 and a state-law constructive fraud claim.
- Defendants argued dismissal was proper under Rooker–Feldman, res judicata, statute of limitations, and lack of Article III standing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jurisdiction under Rooker–Feldman | Redmonds say federal court can hear claims despite state foreclosure because state procedure (Delaware scire facias) denied opportunity to raise them | Claims attack the state foreclosure judgment; federal court lacks jurisdiction to review state-court foreclosure | Counts seeking to undo the foreclosure (declaratory relief, slander of title) barred by Rooker–Feldman; Delaware scire facias allows pleas in avoidance, so no Rooker–Feldman exception applies |
| Fraud exception to Rooker–Feldman | Alleged fraud/deception in how judgment was procured means Rooker–Feldman should not apply | No blanket fraud exception; cannot rely on opponent’s deception to avoid preclusion | Court rejects a blanket fraud exception; plaintiffs cannot use alleged deception to bypass Rooker–Feldman |
| Statute of limitations for TILA-based claims (15 U.S.C. §1640/§1641) | Plaintiffs contend claims timely or discovery rule applies | Statute mandates 1-year limitations from the occurrence of violation (no discovery toll) | TILA claims time-barred: alleged assignments/violations occurred before limitations cutoff; counts dismissed as untimely |
| Article III standing for constructive fraud claim | Plaintiffs assert injury from wrongful transfer/securitization and improper foreclosure | Defendants: no concrete, particularized injury—plaintiffs remained obligated on loan and do not allege overpayment or actionable imminent harm | Court follows Rajamin: plaintiffs lack constitutional standing because they allege only paperwork irregularities and not cognizable injury; count dismissed |
Key Cases Cited
- Vossbrinck v. Accredited Home Lenders, Inc., 773 F.3d 423 (2d Cir.) (Rooker–Feldman framework and requirements)
- Kropelnicki v. Siegel, 290 F.3d 118 (2d Cir.) (no blanket fraud exception to Rooker–Feldman)
- Rajamin v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., 757 F.3d 79 (2d Cir.) (standing: paperwork irregularities alone do not create Article III injury)
- Quillen v. Sayers, 482 A.2d 744 (Del. 1984) (limits on counterclaims in Delaware scire facias mortgage actions)
- Gordy v. Preform Bldg. Components, Inc., 310 A.2d 893 (Del. Super. Ct.) (examples of matters permissible in a plea in confession and avoidance)
- Shrewsbury v. The Bank of New York Mellon, 160 A.3d 471 (Del. 2017) (Delaware authority addressing defenses in mortgage scire facias proceedings)