Redding v. District of Columbia, 828 F. Supp. 2d 272

Redding, a Parking Enforcement Officer for DC Public Works, worked from 2001 to 2008 and alleged disabilities and gender-based discrimination and retaliation.
She reported a sexual assault by two coworkers between Oct 2004 and Oct 2005, and informed her union and police; later referenced in EEOC/OHR filings.
On July 3, 2007, she filed a Charge with DC OHR and cross-filed with the EEOC alleging discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment based on gender and disability.
OHR issued a Letter of Determination rejecting all claims on May 27, 2008; EEOC issued a Right to Sue Letter on Feb 24, 2009.
Plaintiff claims she did not receive the Right to Sue Letter; after multiple inquiries, a second copy was mailed and she filed a federal complaint on Oct 22, 2010.
Defendant moved to dismiss or for summary judgment, arguing untimeliness for Counts I–IV under the 90-day rule and Count V under DC limitations.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Counts I–IV are time-barred	Redding contends timely filing or tolling could apply due to non-receipt.	Counts I–IV are barred 90 days after Right to Sue Letter; receipt determined when mailed or actually received; delay not tolled.	Counts I–IV are barred; untimely under 90-day rule.
Whether Count V (assault and battery) is time-barred	(Not explicitly stated as argued in opposition) – maintains potential tolling or applicable period.	Count V falls under DC statute of limitations; three-year general period or one-year subsection; in any case barred as time-barred.	Count V is barred by the applicable statute of limitations and summary judgment is granted on this count.
Whether equitable tolling applies to the ninety-day period	Equitable tolling could excuse late filing due to disability-related hospitalization.	Equitable tolling not established; plaintiff failed to show diligence or facts supporting tolling.	Equitable tolling not applied; no extraordinary circumstances shown.
Whether the complaint should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) for timeliness	Not clearly time-barred on face of complaint.	Time-bar issues are like a statute of limitations and can be resolved on summary judgment.	Court proceeds to summary judgment for timing issues; 12(b)(6) dismissal not warranted.

Rozen v. District of Columbia, 702 F.2d 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Title VII remedial; avoid technicalities while enforcing 90-day filing rule)
Bethel v. Jefferson, 589 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (timing of rights and administrative notices under Title VII)
Plunkett v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 504 F.2d 417 (10th Cir. 1974) (receipt triggering 90-day period for Right to Sue Letter)
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (U.S. 1974) (Supreme Court on notice and timing under Civil Rights Act)
Perry v. Gallaudet Univ., 738 A.2d 1222 (D.C. 1999) (mail delivery and receipt considerations for Right to Sue Letter)
Bowden v. United States, 106 F.3d 433 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (burden shifting for statute of limitations defenses)
Dahlman v. AARP, 791 F. Supp. 2d 68 (D.D.C. 2011) (summary judgment on statute-of-limitations issues)
Smith-Haynie v. District of Columbia, 155 F.3d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (standards for raising statute-of-limitations defenses under Rule 12(b)(6))
Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (when deciding statute-of-limitations, face of complaint must show timeliness)
Knight v. Furlow, 553 A.2d 1232 (D.C. 1989) (discovery rule considerations for injury and wrongdoing; assault cases)
Colbert v. Georgetown Univ., 641 A.2d 469 (D.C. 1994) (accrual rule for discernible injuries)
Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89 (U.S. 1990) (equitable tolling and limitations period fundamentals)