Raymond v. Board of Regents of the University of Minnesota, 140 F. Supp. 3d 807

Background

Raymond, a University of Minnesota Duluth employee, was investigated repeatedly beginning in 2009 for alleged policy violations; he denied the allegations and appealed multiple adverse findings.
He alleges one initial investigation involved biased evidence and collusion; a later investigation relied on that allegedly tainted material and was itself biased, overly broad, and procedurally flawed (no witness examination, distorted statements, biased counsel/investigator).
UMN issued a finding of "just cause" in April 2013 and later moved to terminate; Raymond sought pre‑ and post‑termination hearings through the Office of Conflict Resolution (OCR) and the Regents but alleges those opportunities were denied, reversed, or otherwise unfair.
Raymond withdrew from the post‑termination process claiming futility and bias; he alleges reputational harm from publicity (sexual‑harassment allegations) and lost speaking opportunities.
He sued the University and the Board of Regents under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for procedural due process violations (liberty and property interests), seeking damages and injunctive relief; Defendants moved to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).
The district court granted dismissal without prejudice: the University was immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment and § 1983; damage claims against the Regents in their official capacities were barred, and Raymond failed to state procedural due process claims and failed to exhaust available post‑termination remedies.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the University may be sued under § 1983	Raymond sued University and Regents for due process violations	UMN is an arm of the State and immune under the Eleventh Amendment; state entities aren’t “persons” under § 1983	University dismissed: Eleventh Amendment immunity bars § 1983 suit against UMN (dismissed)
Whether Regents can be sued for damages under § 1983 in official capacities	Raymond seeks damages and injunctive relief from Regents in official capacities	Official‑capacity damage suits are effectively suits against the State and barred by Eleventh Amendment; state officials not “persons” for damages under § 1983	Damage claims against Regents in official capacities dismissed; injunctive claims may proceed in theory
Whether plaintiff alleged conduct sufficient to seek injunctive relief against Regents	Regents have policy/appeal authority; Raymond alleges Regents denied requested appellate review and thus exercised final authority	Defendants say denial of requested hearings alone does not show an unconstitutional policy or final‑authority misuse	Court finds allegations that Regents had final authority and denied appellate review sufficiently plead actionable conduct for injunctive relief at motion‑to‑dismiss stage
Whether Raymond stated procedural due process claims and exhausted remedies	Raymond alleges liberty interest (reputation) and property interest (just‑cause employment), inadequate pre/post termination process, biased procedures, inability to cross‑examine, and that exhaustion was futile	Defendants argue Raymond received adequate pre‑termination notice and opportunity to respond, had available post‑termination procedures which he declined, and failed to exhaust remedies; futility claim speculative	Court holds pre‑termination process adequate; post‑termination remedies were available and Raymond failed to exhaust (withdrawal not permitted to avoid exhaustion); futility exception not shown; due process claims dismissed

Key Cases Cited

Treleven v. Univ. of Minn., 73 F.3d 816 (8th Cir. 1996) (UMN is an instrumentality of the state and shares Eleventh Amendment immunity)
Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (U.S. 1989) (state entities are not "persons" under § 1983 for damage claims)
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility standard for complaints)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (conclusory allegations insufficient to survive dismissal)
Nix v. Norman, 879 F.2d 429 (8th Cir. 1989) (official‑capacity liability requires unconstitutional policy/custom or final authority misused)
Winskowski v. City of Stephen, 442 F.3d 1107 (8th Cir. 2006) (liberty interest in reputation requires stigmatizing charges made public and denied by employee)
Hammer v. City of Osage Beach, 318 F.3d 832 (8th Cir. 2003) (stigma‑plus standard for liberty claims)
Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (property and liberty interests analysis)
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (pretermination process: notice, explanation of evidence, opportunity to respond)
Christiansen v. West Branch Cmty. Sch. Dist., 674 F.3d 927 (8th Cir. 2012) (pretermination and name‑clearing hearing principles)
Riggins v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Neb., 790 F.2d 707 (8th Cir. 1986) (informal supervisor meeting can satisfy pretermination process)
Hopkins v. City of Bloomington, 774 F.3d 490 (8th Cir. 2014) (exhaustion of state remedies required for § 1983 procedural due process claims)
Wax’n Works v. St. Paul, 213 F.3d 1016 (8th Cir. 2000) (same exhaustion principle)
Crooks v. Lynch, 557 F.3d 846 (8th Cir. 2009) (exhaustion needed before bringing § 1983 claim)