Raymond v. Board of Regents of the University of Minnesota
847 F.3d 585
| 8th Cir. | 2017Background
- Raymond, a University of Minnesota Duluth wellness director, was investigated for policy violations including sexual harassment; multiple investigations and appeals found against him.
- An appellate panel found one investigation tainted by bias and ordered a new investigator; Raymond objected to the new investigation and requested participation in investigator selection and recusal, all denied.
- The University concluded there was "just cause" and terminated Raymond; he sought a hearing with the Office of Conflict Resolution (OCR) but withdrew from the OCR process before completion, alleging futility and bias.
- Raymond sued the Regents and the University under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming deprivation of liberty and property without procedural due process, seeking damages and injunctive relief.
- The district court dismissed the suit (Eleventh Amendment barred damages claims against the University and Regents; dismissal of injunctive claims for failure to state a due process claim and for failure to exhaust state remedies).
- On appeal the Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding Raymond failed to plead a pre-termination due process violation and did not adequately allege futility to excuse exhaustion of post-termination remedies.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pre-termination due process required? | Raymond argued investigatory and decision process was biased and deprived him of pre-termination rights. | University argued Raymond received notice, explanation of evidence, and opportunities to respond—satisfying minimal pre-termination process. | Court: No pre-termination violation pled; notice and opportunity to respond were provided, so pre-termination claim fails. |
| Must Raymond exhaust post-termination state remedies for § 1983 procedural due process claim? | Raymond asserted exhaustion was excused because OCR process was futile and biased. | Defendants argued exhaustion is required and plaintiff did not pursue available post-termination remedies. | Court: Exhaustion required; Raymond withdrew and failed to exhaust, so post-termination § 1983 claim is barred. |
| Is futility an exception to exhaustion for § 1983 procedural due process claims? | Raymond urged recognition of a futility exception because OCR allegedly denied confrontation/cross-examination and barred review of sexual-harassment allegations. | Defendants relied on precedents holding post-termination remedies must be pursued; futility not recognized here absent certainty of denial. | Court: Declined to recognize futility as excusing exhaustion on these facts; Raymond’s allegations were speculative and did not show certain inability to obtain relief. |
| Adequacy of OCR procedures (confrontation/cross-exam rights)? | Raymond argued OCR lacked required rights (e.g., cross-examination), making process inadequate. | University pointed to OCR rules giving fair opportunity to present witnesses and evidence and available appeals. | Court: Even if ambiguous, lack of explicit cross-examination does not render pre-termination process inadequate nor excuses exhaustion; issues could be raised and appealed within OCR process. |
Key Cases Cited
- Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (pre-termination due process requires notice and opportunity to respond)
- Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (due-process pretermination protections calibrated by balancing test; formal evidentiary hearing not always required)
- Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of Fla., 457 U.S. 496 (1982) (general rule that exhaustion of state remedies is not a prerequisite to § 1983, subject to exceptions)
- Winskowski v. City of Stephen, 442 F.3d 1107 (8th Cir. 2006) (an employee who fails to request available post-termination process cannot later sue for deprivation of it)
- Hopkins v. City of Bloomington, 774 F.3d 490 (8th Cir. 2014) (discussing exhaustion as affirmative defense and exception for procedural due process)
- Keating v. Neb. Pub. Power Dist., 562 F.3d 923 (8th Cir. 2009) (recognizing contexts where exhaustion exceptions arise)
- Ace Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Fed. Crop Ins. Corp., 440 F.3d 992 (8th Cir. 2006) (futility exception to exhaustion in non-§ 1983 contexts)
- McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140 (1992) (administrative exhaustion principles in constitutional tort contexts)