Raymond Espinosa v. Aaron's Rents, Inc., 484 S.W.3d 533

Background

Espinosa was general manager at Aaron’s Monroe store from ~Oct 2002 to Jan 2006; Aaron’s planned to terminate him for poor performance.
After Espinosa left, Aaron’s found missing merchandise and suspect rental records tied to Espinosa’s employee number; Aaron’s reported suspected theft to police.
DA investigated; Espinosa was not indicted; Aaron’s actions led to criminal charges that were later no-billed and dismissed in Aug 2008.
Espinosa sued for malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation, and unpaid quarterly bonus; Aaron’s moved for summary judgment on multiple grounds.
Bankruptcy: Espinosa filed Chapter 7 in 2010; he did not disclose the suit; after Aaron’s motion, bankruptcy court allowed amendment to disclose, trustees appointed, and case status evolved.
Court held: summary judgment in favor of Aaron’s on all tort claims; issues include judicial estoppel, privilege, and lack of malice.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Espinosa is judicially estopped	Bankruptcy court allowed amendment; disclosure is permissible.	Estoppel precludes suit due to non-disclosure in bankruptcy.	No judicial estoppel; bankruptcy court permitted disclosure; estoppel cannot bar suit.
Whether Aaron’s initiated or procured the criminal prosecution	Aaron’s provided or caused false information to prosecutors.	Prosecution based on independent investigation by DA; Aaron’s did not procure.	Aaron’s did not procure; no evidence of false material information used to prosecute.
Whether qualified privilege bars defamation claims for internal-investigation communications	Espinosa’s statements to police/DA and customers were defamatory and not privileged.	Statements within investigation and to police/DA are privileged; malice required to defeat.	Qualified privilege applies to investigative communications; statements to police/DA privileged; no malice shown for privileged statements.
Whether the gas-station statement was time-barred or defective as to privilege	All defaming statements are actionable; limitations not properly addressed.	Gas-station statement barred by limitations; privileged communications except unprivileged one.	Limitations held applicable to unprivileged statement; other privileged statements secure summary judgment.
Whether Espinosa can maintain claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and fraud/breach of fiduciary duty	Post-termination conduct and misrepresentation support those claims.	IF emotional distress requires egregious conduct; no basis beyond other torts; no fiduciary duty owed.	IFED claims rejected; fraud/breach claims rejected; no successful stand-alone torts.

Key Cases Cited

Randall’s Food Mkts., Inc. v. Johnson, 891 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. 1995) (qualified privilege boundaries for investigations; requires actual malice to defeat)
Saudi v. Brieven, 176 S.W.3d 108 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004) (actual malice standard for privilege when publishing during investigations)
Kroger Tex. Ltd. P’ship v. Suberu, 216 S.W.3d 788 (Tex. 2006) (malice and egregious conduct standards in torts; limits on post-termination claims)
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 92 S.W.3d 502 (Tex. 2002) (procurement of prosecution and role of discretion by prosecutors)
Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Lieck, 881 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. 1994) (defining when a party procures criminal prosecution and reliance on prosecutorial discretion)
GTE Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. 1999) (standards for intentional infliction of emotional distress; post-termination conduct limits)
In re Coastal Plains, Inc., 179 F.3d 197 (5th Cir. 1999) (federal bankruptcy-disclosure standards in applying judicial-estoppel doctrine)
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860 (Tex. 2010) (standard of review for summary judgment; de novo review)
Forbes Inc. v. Granada Biosciences, Inc., 124 S.W.3d 167 (Tex. 2003) (no-evidence standard and reasonable-inference framework)