Raymond Davis, Sr. v. City of Clarksville, 492 F. App'x 572

Davis, an African American, worked for Clarksville Police Department from 1993 to 2009, as a domestic-violence investigator since 2000.
He previously sued the City for racial discrimination in 2006, which settled in 2007, after which he remained employed.
Ansley became Chief of Police in 2007, later overseeing the internal investigation into Davis’s alleged dishonesty.
Davis alleges a continuing racially hostile environment with incidents mostly occurring before or during 2006; after settlement, only a few isolated remarks cited.
The pivotal event is the December 17, 2008 traffic-stop incident, where Davis’s reports conflicted with eyewitness accounts and a recording; Davis was terminated for dishonesty after an internal investigation.
Davis then claimed retaliation under federal and state law after filing a right-to-sue letter in March 2009 and initiating suit in June 2009; district court granted summary judgment for the City on all claims.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Prima facie case of discrimination	Davis identified a white officer (Moore) with similar untruthfulness who was not terminated.	Disciplinary decisions depended on the facts; Moore’s outcome was distinguishable based on the underlying conduct.	Davis established a prima facie case; pretext required but City’s reasons deemed legitimate.
Pretext and honest-belief standard	City’s reasons for termination were pretextual given Davis’s disputed facts.	City reasonably relied on particularized facts from a thorough investigation.	Summary judgment affirmed; City’s honest-belief at time of decision supported termination.
Comparator adequacy	Moore as non-protected comparator similarly situated in dishonesty investigations.	Moore’s conduct and context differed in material respects.	Moore not sufficiently analogous; nonetheless City’s pretext defense stands.
Retaliation causation	Termination occurred shortly after Davis’s protected activity, implying causation.	City’s reasons tied to dishonesty with substantial, particularized facts; causation not shown.	Summary judgment for City on retaliation claims; no actionable causation shown.

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (U.S. 1973) (establishes burden-shifting framework for discrimination)
Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (U.S. 1981) (formula for prima facie case and pretext)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (U.S. 1986) (credibility and jury role on summary judgment)
Wright v. Murray Guard, Inc., 455 F.3d 702 (6th Cir. 2006) (similarity and comparators in disciplining acts)
Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344 (6th Cir. 1998) (guidance on similarly situated analysis)
Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (U.S. 1981) (see above)
Wexler v. White’s Fine Furniture, Inc., 317 F.3d 564 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc; honest-belief & pretext framework)
Clay v. United Parcel Serv., 501 F.3d 695 (6th Cir. 2007) (rebuttal of pretext via particularized facts)
Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799 (6th Cir. 1998) (honest-belief standard in pretext)
Chen v. Dow Chemical Co., 580 F.3d 394 (6th Cir. 2009) (pretext framework and admissible evidence)
Arendale v. City of Memphis, 519 F.3d 587 (6th Cir. 2008) (causation in retaliation claims)