James P. Smith v. Chrysler Corporation

Truck- Tony Scott regard. See tions” 312, 315 NLRB, Inc. ing, not to permitted ALJ testimony with management’s Talsol consider issue. conclusive policy ato regard ap- provide, on did Talsol note doWe employees three testimony that peal, supporters, Union also list,10 were who claims compensation worker’s filed had after absenteeism terminated been com- their injuries, related work be- done discharges were their plaints dis- been animus anti-union cause however, to evidence, nowas There missed. dismissed, were charges why establish a dif- decided complaints were and their Moreover, of these none ALJ. ferent McNew, whose similarly situated ees wide- particularly activities pro-union evidence substantial Accordingly, spread. un- Talsol finding Board’s supports violation McNew discharged lawfully NLRA. Conclusion

III. reasons, enforcement foregoing For the Board order decision GRANTED. Plaintiff-Appellant, SMITH, P.

James CORPORATION, CHRYSLER Defendant-Appellee. 97-1572. No. Appeals, Court States United Circuit. Sixth 18, 1998. Argued June 15, 1998. Sept. Decided at 293. J.A. Wilson. Bonnie nut and Robinson, Chest- Treasure Connie Employees

801 Raftery (briefed), J. James Davis R. Willis Southfield, Associates, Raftery &

(argued);, Plaintiff-Appellant.. MI, for ! Corp., Chrysler (briefed), Hortop K.C. (ar Suma A. MI, Margaret Park, Highland Corp., Motors briefed), Chrysler gued Defendant-Appellee. MI, Hills, Auburn GILMAN, CLAY, MOORE, Before: Judges. Circuit of the opinion J., GILMAN, delivered CLAY, MOORE, J., joined. court, in which separate 809-810), delivered (pp. J. opinion. concurring

OPINION Judge.

GILMAN, Circuit as an being hired after year Within James Corporation, Chrysler electrician failing disclose fired P. Smith sleeping narcoleptic-like from a he suffered forms. medical job-related disorder against suit brought Smith firing him given reason discrim- unlawful mask designed pretext Americans in violation ination § (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. Act Disabilities Civil Handicappers’ Michigan seq., et Comp. Laws (“MHCRA”), Mich. Act Rights 1997). The (West seq. 37.1101, et § Ann. summary judgment granted court district latter’s finding that Chrysler, favor lied on Smith belief faith good liability. For it from shielded forms below, AFFIRM we forth set reasons court. district judgment I. BACKGROUND doses Cylert of Ritalin and to aid in treating unspecified Smith’s sleep otherwise disorder. began experiencing symptoms relat- Both drugs typically are used the treat- ing sleeping to his disorder 1989. While ment of narcolepsy. The driving drug late at night, home combined Smith would sud- denly initially treatment was find that he missed his successful in turn off alleviat- ing being symptoms. road without Smith’s completely able to recall driven, having the last mile or so. After years More than after visiting three first experiencing a number of episodes, these clinic, applied for a Sleep Smith went to Respiratory Associ- job as an Chrysler’s electrician at Sterling Michigan, ates of (“sleep P.C. disorder clin- Heights plant. assembly completing ic”) April of 1990 to determine their job application position, for the cause. asked fill out to a “Self-Administered Medi- conjunction In seeking with treatment History” cal form, form. On this Smith clinic, from the sleep disorder complet- Smith “no” question checked to the you of “Have questionnaire ed a titled “Clinical Data Base: ever or had have now unusual tiredness History.” questionnaire, In this Smith noted or fatigue?” Smith later testified that he that he “falling asleep was driving,” while “no” cheeked because episodes his brief were had driven onto the shoulder of the road by never fatigue tiredness; caused rather, “many times” because sleepiness, of had ex- they would occur warning without whenever perienced episodes of “fighting sleep” on his his mind was completely not focused on a way home, occasionally had hallucina- activity. task or tions. Smith later testified that he used the “sleep” given words Smith was also “sleepiness” drug a for lack test as part of a of job better word application. to his describe his In symptoms. taking test, As drug this brief, explained in episodes] “[these Smith were complete asked to a consent form really falling not like asleep, in that [I] did “Pre-Employment titled Screening and Re- drowsy not feel incident, tired before the lease Liability.” of form, On this dis- Smith that they but really not like blacking closed that he had used or ingested drugs either, out immediately because after the Cylert or Ritalin within the past ninety days. incidents, thought it, [I] about and could During the physical subsequent examination, recall certain things happened.” Smith claims that he discussed one or both of At sleep clinic, Smith these medications with Chrysler’s company by Miller, treated Steven physician’s a doctor, assis- Dr. Richard Rood. Smith also states tant working supervision under the of Dr. that he told Dr. Rood that a doctor from the Harvey Organek. help To diagnose type sleep disorder clinic said “might of sleep disorder from suffered, which Smith have a had mild case of narcolepsy.” Dr. Miller undergo had him a polysomnography, Rood, however, had no recollection of dis- a type of sleep proficiency test. The results cussing either medication or sleeping disor- of this test were inconclusive. Although ders with Smith during physical exam. Smith met of some the criteria associated After completed Smith these forms and a narcolepsy, with he did not meet all of the tests, series of hired him as disorder’s textbook symptoms. classic Nar- electrician 10,1993. on August Smith was colepsy is defined in Dorland’s Medical placed p.m. the 4 to 12:30 a.m.'evening DICTIONARY as a sleeping disorder of un- By shift. accounts, all Smith’s work while at known etiology by “recurrent, characterized Chrysler was exemplary. February In of uncontrollable, episodes brief sleep, often 1994, Smith was told super- immediate associated hallucinations, with hypnagogic ca- visor to plant obtain a taplexy, driver’s license sleep so that ed.1994). paralysis.” he use the company’s could evaluating After electric the results of carts to sleep pro- get ficiency test, from one plant Miller end of the that, informed to the Smith al- other though he did whenever power not have narcolepsy, proba- he was shut down. The bly suffered from a variant of license also operate the disorder entitled Smith to a wide and, hence, would be though variety treated as of heavy he machinery. In order to were narcoleptic. Miller then prescribed license, obtain required Smith was Examination” License “Driver’s complete Syndrome. Narcolepsy “no” to checked form, Smith On form. rea- made narcolep- recommendation This you ever “Have question necessity and sons sy?” I would patient. convenience narcoleptic-like meantime, Smith’s he be request make again in November resurfaced episodes shift. work day regular placed clinic sleep disorder went the above regard with Questions controlling his help in later months a few my attention. Smith, may directed Miller examining Upon- symptoms. sleep proficiency discovery that further during concluded revealed later It was latency test letters, multiple with as well both actually test authored Miller conclusively determin- pro- prove useful might off signing simply Organek Dr. narcolepsy. suffered made a he ing whether testified Miller drafts. posed tests these results to validate the June In order diagnosis definitive condition, treating Smith’s help Rood, who Dr. provide order 16 letter needed advised Miller dif- “all unfamiliar said Miller daytime regular ato hours his work change somno- excessive disorders types ferent Rood Dr. wrote Organek Dr. schedule. thumbnail readily understood lence,” a request- 11,1994, May on effect that letter Miller sleeping disorder. of Smith’s sketch day “regular ato moved be ing de- however, cannot Smith maintained, that Dr. necessity.” to a “medical due shift” work from suffer finitively said be was Smith that explained further Organek criteria all meet not does because relat- condition medical a “for care his under In- diagnosis. such necessary to make disorder.” sleep/wake atoed most, Smith, at that stead, Miller testified letter, Smith this narcolepsy.” received Rood Dr. After a “variant from suffers plant’s 18, at 1994 May him on with met letter, 16 June receiving after Shortly a shift request personally facility to medical inquire Organek Dr. telephoned Dr. Rood entry following made Rood Dr. change. why and of treatment dates Smith’s about day: that chart medical in his day shift a move that felt Organek Dr. nar- day wanting shift —states in Comes responded Organek Dr. imperative. Takes before[.] &1989 since coleptic because warranted change was shift that & worried in Milford Ritalin —lives Chrysler, narcolepsy. he felt Smith @ am. 1:30 home drive regarding] or Organek’s Dr. on however, never acted @ kids with or 8 7 up get has Then change. a shift request Smith’s as he’s long asOK Does errands. to do re- series this shortly after Sometime Will Organek. by Dr. Diagnosed busy. representative made, a union quests this on admission No letter. bring superinten- assembly plant approached physical. hire] [new NH that her Michael, advised and dent, Valerie re- to his respond Chrysler did When staying awake difficulty having Smith changed, be hours work Smith’s quest is record The night. at driving home while Rood to Dr. letter another sent Organek Dr. source representative’s toas silent letter body of 16, June on ac- herself Michael information, and this as follows: reads its basis. not know did she knowledged under patient referenced above prompted event, communication this any Narcolepsy. treatment my care records pull Smith’s Michael care in the consideration important An investigation an begin and sleep and regular ais patients of these In Smith's Chrysler. history with a letter I sent schedule. wake Rood’s Dr. file, uncovered Michael ment patient requesting 11,1994 May meeting May, 1994 from The 242, 248, 2505, U.S. 106 S.Ct. 91 L.Ed.2d 202 case was later removed to federal district (1986). court on the question juris- federal pursuant diction § to 28 U.S.C. After Proving Discriminatory B. Intent Under completing discovery, Chrysler a motion filed ADA the summary for judgment. granting In sum- mary judgment Chrysler, favor of the MHCRA, Under the it is unlawful for an district court sleeping held that Smith’s dis- employer to discriminate of a[n “because em- order major “does affect a activity life as if Comp. ployee’s] handicap.” Mich. Laws Ann. totally he is not engaged during period the 37.1102(a) (West 1997). § employer An awake, which he is he will fall asleep.” Al- required also under the statute to “accommo- though the court held that Smith had estab- a handicapper date purposes employ- prima lished a ADA, facie case under the it ment ... unless [employer] demonstrates concluded that Smith prove was unable impose accommodation would that Chrysler’s proffered non-discriminatory Comp. undue hardship.” Mich. Laws Ann. firing reason for pretext him awas intended (West 37.1102(b) 1997). § to hide unlawful discrimination. Specifically, language of the MHCRA mirrors that the district noted: court “Plaintiffs claims of the ADA Both acts forbid an that he did not consider his condition to be from discriminating on basis of an em unusual, and that he was not aware ployee’s disability. See Monette Electron fact diagnosed that he having was with nar- Sys., Corp., 1173, ic Data 90 F.3d 1178 n. 3 colepsy are incredulous.” Smith filed a mo- (6th Cir.1996) (noting analysis that the under reconsider, tion to arguing that the district ADA). parallels the MHCRA that under the court possible failed to consider all ways Because resolution of Smith’s ADA claim also pretext can be demonstrated. The district disposes claim, of his MHCRA we will ana- motion, court denied finding that Smith lyze by case reference the ADA claim. pretext unable to demonstrate under of the argued alternative methods designed, in his mo- The ADA part, to combat tion. timely appeal This followed. stereotypical assumptions underlying so- by prepon- a employee to show See back to disabilities. ciety’s of those with views 12101(a)(7). by Sena- As noted that the § derance of the evidence 42 U.S.C. ADA: passage of the during actually discharge tor Harkin proffered reason simply this: That [ADA] of the “The thesis unlawful discrimina- pretext intended to hide ought judged with disabilities people production Id. the burden tion. While abilities; they should not be basis of their parties and forth between shifts back against based on judged nor discriminated framework, Douglas under McDonnell fear, my- ignorance, or prejudice, unfounded proving that the em- burden of ultimate judged ought thologies; people employee on against the ployer discriminated and the medical evidence upon the relevant at all disability her remains account of his or Cong. Rec. 7422- they S have.” abilities Monette, 90 F.3d employee. times with the 1990) (statement OS, (daily June ed. at 1186-87. Harkin). end, ADA Sen. To challenge the district Chrysler does not discriminating employers from prohibits holding court’s established with a qualified “a individual disabili- against under the disability prima facie case of discrimination of such individual ty because job application procedures, similarly ADA. concedes regard advancement, discharge hiring, non-discriminatory reason for fir- proffered job ees, training, compensation, employee him, i.e., job he forms ing lied various conditions, terms, privileges and other narcoleptic he he stated that was wherein 12112(a). § employment.” 42 U.S.C. fatigue. suffered from unusual and had not appeal focuses on Smith’s This therefore may prove discrimina employee An Chrysler’s challenge legitimacy disability in her two on his or tion based firing him. Smith’s proffered reason ways. putting forward direct first is view, the in the record demon- evidence had a discrimina that the defendant evidence (1) not, from a medical he did strates that: tory carrying out motive Runyon, actually narcolepsy, 149 F.3d standpoint, suffer decision. See Robinson (6th Cir.1998) (discussing the very 512-14 sleeping from a but rather circumstan- direct versus (2) between difference sleeping disor- narcolepsy; similar to case). evidence proof VII Such tial in Title by nor caused associated was neither der form, example, of an take the would (3) fatigue; unusual symptoms of employee, “I fired employer telling an Rood that he was up front Dr. disclosed “rarely Because are disabled.” because job applied for a at narcoleptic when he first lips of from the there direct evidence will be (4) 1993; timing Chrysler’s Chrysler of in the ... his or her proclaiming the defendant history employment investigation into his animus,’’id, method employees have a second request for a suspiciously to his close indirect burden- prove discrimination: the to to accommodate his change working in hours in McDon- shifting approach first articulated (5) disorder; Chrysler’s investi- sleeping Green, 792, Douglas Corp. 411 U.S. nell shoddy, Mi- as ill-informed and gation was (1973). 802-03, 1817, 668 36 L.Ed.2d 93 S.Ct. attempt personal- to failed to make chael to route that Smith seeks by It is this latter physicians, treating or or ly interview him his his ADA claim. prove nu- on the subtle attempt to educate herself meth evidence the indirect Under gen- in surrounding sleeping disorders ances od, prima a must first establish employee the light In particular. condition eral and his Monette, 90 facie case discrimination. jury evidence, that a claims of this employee successful the F.3d at 1186. Once Chrysler’s reason determine whether should ease, mandatory a prima out a facie ly makes pretextual. firing him was is created presumption discrimination proffer employer to burden shifts to the the Proving ADA Under the Pretext C. discharging non-discriminatory reason by pretext employee can show An 1178, 1186. If the employee. Id at the employer’s prof the offering evidence burden, then to its employer is able sustain fact, no did fered reason evaporates into a mandatory presumption the decision, or was never actually its inference, motivate shifts and the burden permissive 806 Co., (7th 557, discharge past employee. to an net Wire 824 F.2d 559-560 used Inc., Cir.1987). Management, v. Multi-Care 97 Kocsis rationale behind rule is (6th 876, challenging 883 F.3d that the focus of a discrimination suit-is on action, employee an employer’s an “must employer. employer intent If employer’s reasons demonstrate honestly, mistakenly, albeit believes them, independently if reasons {each non-discriminatory upon it reason relied employer to it caused take action [the] decision, making employment its then the did) not true.” Int’l are Kariotis Navistar employer arguably necessary lacks the dis- (7th Corp., 131 F.3d 676 Cir. Trans. words, criminatory arguing intent. “In other added). 1997) (emphasis accuracy employer’s about the assess- case, Smith In this has marshalled the question ment ais distraction is because attempt an evidence in above-mentioned not whether the reasons proving pre- fit within all three methods ‘right decision are but whether the Despite attempt neatly segre- text. this description er’s reasons its is honest.’” ultimately gate proof, all of it down boils Kariotis, F.3d (quoting 131 at 677 Gustovich single argument challenging to a the deci- Communications, Inc., ATv. & T 972 F.2d process Chrysler deciding sional followed in Cir.1992)). 848 argument him. of this fire The essence Circuit, however, apparently The Seventh Chrysler attempt If made an follows: require employer does not an to demonstrate conducting probe further when its investi- reasonably grounded its belief was on gation, by talking such as Smith or read- particularized facts it before at the ing sleep- literature the nature of Instead, time of the action. disorders, ing then would have learned that apply, only the rule to need Smith did not have suffer from provide firing an honest reason for the em- and, hence, fatigue unusual did not lie if ployee, even that reason had no factual

job Alternatively, notes that forms. (not- Pollard, support. See 559 at up narcoleptic front that he was disclosed ing you honestly explain that “if job Chrysler; at reasons applied when he first for a decision, your in-depth so if behind ill- had conducted more but decision was ill-considered, im- inquiry, your explanation it would have learned that the informed or pact job responses forms false ‘pretext.’”). not a We find an such ab- was muted disclosure. earlier application stract rule at odds discriminatory linchpin argument to Smith’s underlying with the purpose behind the Chrysler consciously is that refused to make Act—ie., actions taken re- an effort to uncover this evidence because it garding disability individual with wanted fire him after it learned he had a fear, grounded on fact “on and not unfounded disability. “sticking The basis for this prejudice, ignorance, mythologies.” argument head in the sand” is that the inves- Cong. 7422-03, Rec. (daily S ed. June tigation immediately was conducted almost 1990) (statement 6, Harkin). of Sen. To the requested an after accommodation for the application extent Seventh Circuit’s disability that facts the uncovered employer’s the “honest belief’ rule credits an judged using stereotyped assumptions. requiring reasonably belief without that it be Chrysler responds argument by to this particularized based facts than rather adopt us to the urging so-called “honest be- ignorance reject mythology, ap- we its rule, developed as lief’ rule. This in a series proach. decisions, provides of Seventh Circuit that so Although previ this circuit has not long employer honestly as the believed in the ously, addressed whether the version of the proffered given employment reason its rule by “honest belief’ articulated Seventh action, employee pretext the cannot establish context, applied be Circuit should the ADA employer’s ultimately even if the is reason applied a variant been of the rule has the mistaken, foolish, trivial, to be found or base- Kariotis, 676; Rehabilitation Act See context. McCoy less. See 131 at Pesterfield (6th TVA, Co., 437, v. 941 F.2d 443-44 WGN Continental Broad. 957 F.2d 368, Cir.1992); Mag- analysis 373 Pollard v. Rea “[t]he Because claims under the

807 safely accommodation to work under brought under roughly parallels those ADA Monette, Act],” at 90 F.3d that could make. TVA [the Rehabilitation “honest belief’ the form of the we find 941 F.2d at 443-44. particu- employed rule Pesterfield Thus, according Pesterfield, in order for to ADA context. larly in the relevant non-discriminatory employer’s proffered an his em- Pesterfield, employee sued In an be employment for its action to consid basis to clear him as medical- ployer for its refusal held, honestly employer must be the ered hospi- he was to return to work after ly able reasonable reliance on able to establish its psychological of a treatment talized the it at particularized facts that were before the below, employee losing the disability. After made. If the the time the decision was that the proved argued appeal that he produce unable such evidence employer is to firing him was discrim- employer’s reason for action, then the support its that the ba- inatory. employee claimed if apply. rule Even “honest belief’ does (its interpreta- decision employer’s for the sis showing, able to make such employer the from the it had received tion of letter by the rule is not protection the afforded psychologist) was mis- employee’s treating Pesterfield, As noted in once automatic. argument, the support for As taken. point employer particu is able testimony of employee introduced the decision, its larized facts that motivated tes- psychologist treating psychologist. produce opportunity has the employee misinterpreted his letter had been tified that contrary.” F.2d at 443. “proof employee was employer and that the by the context, “if As noted in similar one court fully to work at fact able to return employer made an error too obvious employer re- letter. The time he wrote the unintentional, an perhaps it had unlawful be on its good its faith rebanee sponded that doing v. District so.” Fischbach motive interpretation psychologist’s letter Corrections, Dept. 86 F.3d Columbia finding it had discriminated precluded (D.C.Cir.1996) (holding that against employee. that the plaintiff to estabbsh failed agreed. analyzing In the em- court This nondiseriminatory reason was proffered er’s argument, the court noted ployee’s pretextual). not whether question is thus TVA’s “[t]he employable plaintiff was not decision employer deciding In an whether condition was correct psychiatric to his due reasonably particularized facts relied on ‘objective’ isWhat standards. measured it, require that then before we do not TVA, fact, acted on is that relevant employer by the process used decisional plaintiff’s about condition faith bebef good no stone unturned. optimal or that left and, opinion, on Dr. Paine’s Rather, the em key inquiry is whether out, proof is no pointed there court district reasonably informed and con ployer made a Pesterfield, 941 F.2d at contrary.” taking an adverse before sidered decision added). deciding whether (emphasis Dept. Com action. Texas Cf. employment deci- for its employer’s reason 248, 256, Burdine, munity 450 U.S. Affairs faith, good court made in sion (ex (1981) 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 101 S.Ct. a reasonable stressed pretext establishes plaining employee As noted reaching its conclusion. proffered “by showing by the court: credence.”). unworthy Al explanation reasonably relied medical staff TVA’s attempting though should resist courts report plaintiffs of upon the medical process by employers micro-manage used reasonably in- private psychiatrist and decisions, nei making their has Plaintiff terpreted its contents. they blindly em assume should ther prove that TVA’s decision failed to honest. of reasons is ployer’s description its upon a stereo- him was based terminate suffi produce employee is able When psy- persons with toward typed attitude employer to establish that cient evidence upon a than chological handicaps rather reasonably and informed to make a failed medically judg- supported reasoned taking its adverse before considered decision not returned plaintiff could ment that 808 action, thereby making opinion deci- single its is the communication from the credence,” process “unworthy sional of then representative union complained that Smith placed by reliance in such a falling asleep driving while home after

process honestly cannot be said to be held. work. fact, Applying principles asleep” these Smith did not “fall at the case, present Chrys phrase facts in the we wheel as that commonly find under- reasonably particularized ler relied on the stood. The essential characteristic narco- facts at hand when it determined that lepsy is that suddenly afflicted individuals falsely stated on his Driver’s License uncontrollably lapse sleep-like into a Examination narcolep form he was not interval, state typically for brief when their Chrysler tic. had before it letters from mind is not focused on some task or activity. physician Smith’s treating stating that Smith See HarRISOn’s Prinoiples Internal being was narcolepsy, treated for the medical (9th ed.1980). Fatigue, in con- Medicine opinion expressed by Organek Dr. during his trast, is defined as “weariness or exhaustion telephone conversation with Dr. Rood that labor, exertion, from or stress.” Merriam narcolepsy, Smith suffered from and Dr. Collegiate Dictionary Webster’s indicating Rood’s medical notes ed.1997) added). (emphasis Similarly, the suffering himself admitted to narcolep from appears word nothing tiredness more sy since 1989. The burden of production synonym than a for fatigue. The dictionary thus shifted to Smith to demonstrate that confirms that tiredness means “drained of Chrysler’s reliance on those facts was unrea strength energy: fatigued often sonable. This Smith has been unable to do. point exhaustion.” Merriam Webster’s Chrysler’s conclusion that Smith suffered Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed.1997) from narcolepsy was based on its consider- added). (emphasis fatigue, Tiredness and ation medically of the opinions informed defined, thus do not remotely even cover the knowledge those with narcolepsy about experienced by situation narcoleptics. Final- general particular— and Smith’s disorder in ly, in her Rood, conversations with Dr. Mi- treating himself and physician. attempted chael never per- validate her Given the amount and the source of informa- opinion by sonal inquiring about whether uncovered, tion that investigation we are narcoleptics suffer from fatigue. unusual Chrysler satisfied that diligent in investi- question, however, The essential gating the say matter. Nor can we narcoleptics whether suffer from unusual fa- Chrysler’s interpretation reliance on or tigue, Chrysler but whether had a reasonable opinion from Smith’s own treat- basis to believe that Smith had lied when he ing physician was unreasonable. Just as the question checked “no” to the you “Have ever treating psycholo- reliance had or have now unusual tiredness gist’s letter in was found to be Pesterfield fatigue?” general Given the understanding reasonable, Chrysler’s so too was reliance on of the terms “tiredness” “fatigue” as provided medical opinion by Smith’s dictionary, defined opposed treating physician narcolep- that Smith was etiology narcolepsy unknown tic. and its ac- companying symptoms, we find that said, however, The same cannot be could not reasonably have believed that Chrysler’s about belief that Smith lied when (based Smith had lied solely on the comment put he on his Self-Administered Medical His representative) union without further tory form that he had never suffered investigation. unusual fatigue. tiredness Chrysler’s be hand, Chrysler, on the other pro- seeks to lief that Smith regard lied not the vide support factual for Michael’s any particularized result belief facts uncovered pointing to during rather, questionnaire the medical investigation; solely completed personal opinion sought Michael’s when first peo treat- ple ment suffer from at clinic. Specifical- unusual fa tigue. The only stereotype-free ly, Chrysler upon basis notes that stated in Smith the which Michael questionnaire could have formed such an struggled that he to stay intertwined, pretextual the so are plains driving. sleep” while “fight to had awake suspi- fishy and so of them of one the clinic’s character to answers own Smith’s While sum- withstand could certainly pro- cious, plaintiff the that would questionnaire belief, Acme-Evans Russell Michael’s judgment.” for mary basis a reasonable vide (7th Mi- Thus detail: Co., essential one 51 F.3d overlooks Chrysler it- may contained explanations suspicious have the not did chael multitude information she her when investigatory employer’s questionnaire the the in that suggest before self may not Smith Just as applica- decision. her made that questionable so process was conversations private the advantage of inappropri- take rule belief’ “honest tion chal- treating physicians he had with ate. he when he lied that belief Chrysler’s lenging however, concern, present not á Such cannot Chrysler narcoleptic, not he said was over raised doubt us. The case the before clin- by the provided hindsight the use 20/20 for justification alternative second Chrysler’s belief its own to buttress questionnaire ic’s an infer- into not translate does firing Smith never had he stated he when lied Smith that Smith’s behind motivation the true that ence fatigue. from unusual suffered justifi- disability. two discharge was any particularized benefit the Without they which from sources the cations lied Smith that belief its support to facts one in nature: separate were derived the Self-Administered out filled he when nar- from suffered Smith whether to related with form, Chrysler is left History Medical reasonably answered colepsy, which assump- incorrect, stereotyped own Michael’s of Smith opinions relying on himself unusual narcoleptics suffer all that tion in- the other while treating physician, earlier, requires ADA As fatigue. noted disor- on judgment specific a more as- volved stereotype-free make employer to an on based that was symptoms mytholo- particular than der’s rather on facts sessment opinion. subjective Hav- own employer’s decisions. employment reaching gy in latter does its reason respect misjudgment with Chrysler’s so to do ing failed the medical medical- general had lied more believing drag Smith its for down not said for- concerning cannot it question, form conclusion supported ly as to honestly held err not belief Chrysler’s therefore did court district mer. The its justification favor judgment alternative summary granting action. inability to show to Smith’s due Chrysler reliance misplaced Chrysler’s Despite pretext. History Medical' Self-Administered Smith’s believe a reasonable form, it have did III. CONCLUSION License Driver’s on his lied reasons, AFFIRM we foregoing For the previously the reasons form Examination court. district judgment over unable been has thus stated. nondiseriminatory Chrysler’s- one come Nav Kariotis See firing him. reasons CONCURRENCE 672, 676 Corp., 181 Inti Trans. istar demon- Cir.1997) (An “must employee concurring. Judge, CLAY, Circuit (each of reasons employer’s that the strate majority’s decision with concur I caused independently them, reasons if Howev- judgment. court’s district affirm did) are action to take [the] disagree I separately because er, I write true”). not Chrysler could holding that majority’s point hand, we wish other theOn lied reasonably believed have not simply strategy out History Medical his Self-Administered support reasons number tossing out he indicated (“SAMH”) when form one hope that in the action tiredness from “unusual suffered never easily backfire. could “stick” them will fatigue.” multiple in which eases may be “There (Mi- states majority defendant by the offered grounds reasonably believed chael) have could com- plaintiff of which action adverse form, (50 cases), sleep paralysis percent), had lied on the SAMH of and (25 general understanding of the “[g]iven the hypnagogic percent). hallucination ‘fatigue’ as defined in words ‘tiredness’ AL., ISSELBAOHER ET OF HARRISON’S PRINCIPLES opposed dictionary as to the unknown (9th ed.1980) (em- Internal Medioine accompanying etiology of .and its added). phasis (based solely symptoms, ... on the comment majority’s Finally, disagree I with the . representative) 'of the union without further statement that Michael’s belief was “based investigation.” disagree majori- I with the solely represen- on the comment of the union ty’s conclusion for three reasons. grounded tative.” Michaells belief was also First, I fail to see how the fact that narco- lay person’s understanding on a common lepsy may etiology be a disease of unknown and, upon thorough this disease source) (origin any has relevance to the Harrison’s, above, description from as noted origin The matter at hand. or source of the I find her belief to be reasonable and based Rather, is not at issue. it is disease upon opposed fact as to unfounded stereo- clinical manifestations of the disease for type. notice; namely, which we take “uncontrolla- sleepiness”, ble see IsselbaoheR et Har- al., Therefore, although agree I that the dis- Principles Internal rison’s Medioine properly granted Chrysler’s trict court mo- (9th ed.1980), and whether it is reason- summary judgment tion for and would there- lay person able for a to believe that someone judgment, fore affirm the court’s I believe afflicted with this disease af- should answer given by Chrysler that each of the reasons firmatively they when if asked suffer from discharge legitimate for Smith’s fatigue.” tiredness or “unusual non-discriminatory. addition, although I agree with the ma- jority’s Principles reliance on Harrison’s

Internal Medicine aas source of reference conditions, disagree for medical I with the majority’s interpretation of Harrison’s de-

scription narcolepsy. A thorough more reading description of Harrison’s of the char-

acteristics of this disease indicates: JONES, Plaintiff-Appellant, Alvin The narcolep- essential characteristic of sy sleepiness. Many is uncontrollable day times a individual is assailed BAKER, al., A. Dennis et Defendants- sleep. uncontrollable desire to Appellees. close, relax,

eyes slows, breathing muscles person appears and the dozing. A No. 97-3406. noise or a enough touch is to awaken these Appeals, United States Court individuals, they may feel refreshed Sixth Circuit. momentarily. aAs rule the condition be- gins in early adolescence or adult life. The Argued Aug. 1998. periods sleep may occur at time of Sept. Decided day, especially patient physi- when the cally inactive. impulse is so

insistent that may the victim be unable through single

sit class in school or a meeting falling asleep. without at once A

given period sleep usually up lasts to 15 min, long seldom as as an hour unless onset,

lying may down. At the there vision, blurring diplopia, ptosis may which question raise the of an ophthalmologic disorder. The condition is (70

often cataplexy percent associated with notes medical day shift regular to work allowed be Dr. Or- from correspondence Smith, the with significant with him provide would forms numerous ganek, sleep/ normalizing his terms benefit Chrys- at tenure brief during his completed his wakeful- maintaining schedule, wake 804 documents, reading ler. After these Michael II. ANALYSIS spoke to Dr. Rood to determine whether Summary Judgment A. Standard narcolepsy. from Noting Smith suffered We review a district court’s order him letters sent to from the granting summary clinic, judgment notes, Terry de novo. own infor- Co., Barr Agency Sales provided by Inc. v. All-Lock Organek during mation Dr. then- conversation, telephone Dr. Rood Like the informed dis court, Michael trict that Smith did indeed we must view the entire suffer record narcolepsy. light party most favorable to opposing .the summary judgment, and draw all reasonable promptly Michael fired lying Smith for party’s inferences favor. Matsushita the self-administered medical history form Radio, Elec. Indus. v.Co. Zenith 475 U.S. and the application. driver’s license This 574, 587-88, 106 S.Ct. 89 L.Ed.2d 538 12,1994. place July action took The basis (1986). end, In the entry summary for Michael’s decision consisted of the two judgment only upheld can plead be if “the Organek letters sent Dr. stating that ings, depositions, to interrogatories, answers being .narcolepsy, treated for Dr. file, together admissions on with the Rood’s notation his medical records of the affidavits, if any, show genu that there is no effect, conversation with Smith to the same ine issue as to material fact and that content of Dr. Rood’s telephone conver- party moving judgment sation Dr. entitled to a Organek, as a per- own her sonal belief matter of law.” Fed. R. narcoleptics 56(c). P. suddenly For a fall Civ. asleep material, due fact fatigue to unusual must affect the drowsiness. out suit; come disputes “[f[actual that are court, suit in Michigan filed state unnecessary irrelevant or will not be count alleging Chrysler’s employment decision Inc., ed.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, MHCRA, violated the ADA and the

Case Details

Case Name: James P. Smith v. Chrysler Corporation

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Date Published: Sep 15, 1998

Citation: 155 F.3d 799

Docket Number: 97-1572

Court Abbreviation: 6th Cir.