Raymond Bronowicz v. County of Allegheny, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 16769

Background

Bronowicz, a former Pennsylvania inmate, was sentenced in 2001 to concurrent terms including incarceration and probation; some counts were assessed "no further penalty.”
Multiple probation revocation proceedings followed (2005, 2008, January 2011) that resulted in additional incarceration; Bronowicz alleges some resentencings were illegal (e.g., sentencing on counts with "no further penalty," exceeding statutory maximums, and a 2011 hearing in absentia with no colloquy).
Bronowicz appealed the January 2011 sentence to the Pennsylvania Superior Court; the Commonwealth conceded error and the Superior Court vacated the January 2011 judgment of sentence and remanded for resentencing.
On remand the trial court ordered Bronowicz paroled forthwith; he was released May 1, 2012.
Bronowicz brought § 1983 claims for wrongful incarceration against county and probation officers (individual and official capacities) and a judge; the district court dismissed, holding Heck barred claims tied to the 2011 sentence and sovereign immunity barred official-capacity claims.
The Third Circuit considered whether the Superior Court vacatur satisfied Heck’s favorable-termination requirement and which claims remain viable.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does the Superior Court’s vacatur of the Jan. 2011 judgment satisfy Heck’s favorable-termination requirement?	Vacatur of the judgment is a favorable termination that permits § 1983 damages claims for the unlawful 2011 incarceration.	Vacatur that does not expressly declare the sentence "illegal" is insufficient under Heck.	Yes. The Superior Court’s vacatur (in light of the Commonwealth’s concession) invalidated the 2011 judgment and satisfies Heck for claims tied to that sentence.
Do § 1983 claims attacking the July 2005 and July 2008 revocations satisfy Heck?	(Implicit) These prior revocations were also unlawful.	No; those revocations were not vacated or appealed, so no favorable termination.	No. Claims tied to 2005 and 2008 revocations remain barred because those proceedings were not terminated in plaintiff’s favor.
Are official-capacity claims against the probation officers barred by sovereign immunity?	Plaintiff argued otherwise.	Defendants asserted sovereign immunity for Pennsylvania probation departments.	Yes. Official-capacity claims against probation officers are barred by sovereign immunity.
Did the district court properly dismiss all claims?	Plaintiff contended dismissal was premature for claims tied to the vacated 2011 sentence.	Defendants urged dismissal under Heck and immunity doctrines.	Affirmed in part, reversed in part: § 1983 claims related to the Jan. 2011 sentence may proceed; other § 1983 claims and official-capacity claims were properly dismissed.

Key Cases Cited

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (U.S. 1994) (favorable-termination rule: § 1983 damages for confinement barred unless conviction/sentence invalidated)
Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (U.S. 2005) (clarifies when § 1983 actions implicate sentence validity)
Kossler v. Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2009) (analyzing whether prior criminal dispositions reflect innocence for Heck purposes)
Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2005) (ARD and favorable-termination discussion; Heck applies even when habeas is unavailable)
Powell v. Weiss, 757 F.3d 338 (3d Cir. 2014) (§ 1983 challenge to parole supervision beyond maximum sentence must satisfy Heck)