Ray v. Union Pacific Railroad
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135123
| S.D. Iowa | 2013Background
- Ray worked for Union Pacific (UP) as an assistant foreman since 1996 and had knee problems treated surgically in Nov. 2009; he initially told his supervisor the surgery was not work-related but filed UP’s injury form on Nov. 19, 2009 reporting cumulative, work-related knee injury.
- UP investigated within days, charged Ray with dishonesty (Rule 1.6) and late reporting (Rule 1.2.5), held a Dec. 22, 2009 hearing with union representation, and terminated Ray Dec. 30, 2009 under its UPGRADE discipline policy (dishonesty = Level 5 → dismissal).
- The union appealed through UP’s internal process and to a Public Law Board (PLB); the PLB found substantial evidence of dishonesty but reduced the penalty to a lengthy suspension (reinstatement without back pay).
- Ray filed an FRSA whistleblower suit alleging retaliation for reporting a work-related injury; UP moved for summary judgment arguing (1) FRSA’s election-of-remedies bars the suit because Ray sought RLA remedies, (2) Ray did not engage in protected, good-faith reporting and the injury report did not contribute to termination, and (3) PLB factual findings are preclusive.
- The court denied summary judgment: it held (a) §20109(f) does not bar FRSA suits merely because an RLA grievance/arbitration was pursued (following ARB and other authority); (b) Ray established triable issues on FRSA elements (good-faith reporting and that the report was a contributing factor), and (c) collateral estoppel did not preclude the FRSA claims because PLB findings did not resolve the same legal issues.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether RLA grievance/arbitration bars an FRSA suit under §20109(f) (election of remedies) | Ray: RLA grievance/arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement is not "another provision of law," so §20109(f) does not bar an FRSA claim | UP: Pursuing RLA remedies is seeking protection under another provision of law and thus triggers the election-of-remedies bar | Court: §20109(f) does not bar FRSA suit when remedy pursued was an RLA grievance/arbitration; follows ARB and district court precedent and adopts Chevron deference to agency interpretation |
| Whether Ray engaged in protected activity (good-faith injury report) | Ray: His November 2009 injury report stated work-related cause and he believed it then; inconsistencies elsewhere do not negate good faith | UP: Ray changed accounts multiple times and was dishonest, so his report lacked good faith and is not protected | Court: Question for jury — viewing record favorably to Ray, sufficient evidence exists that he believed his injury was work-related when he reported it, satisfying the protected-activity element for summary judgment purposes |
| Whether the injury report was a "contributing factor" to termination | Ray: Report triggered investigation that led to discipline; causation may be presumed where report and adverse action are inextricably intertwined | UP: Discipline was for dishonesty and late reporting under uniform policy; any link to the report is pretextual | Court: Genuine issue exists — temporal proximity and the inextricable-link theory create a triable inference that the report contributed to the termination |
| Whether PLB findings are preclusive (collateral estoppel/RLA binding effect) | Ray: PLB decision on discipline does not resolve FRSA issues (good faith and contributing factor) and is not dispositive here | UP: PLB found Ray lied and harassment didn’t cause his prior misstatements; those factual findings should preclude FRSA claims | Court: Collateral estoppel inapplicable — PLB findings do not satisfy identity/issue requirement for preclusion of the FRSA issues at stake |
Key Cases Cited
- Araujo v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, 708 F.3d 152 (3d Cir. 2013) (applies AIR-21 burden-shifting to FRSA and explains contributing-factor standard)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (Supreme Court) (summary judgment rule; movant’s initial burden)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (Supreme Court) (genuine issue of material fact standard on summary judgment)
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (Supreme Court) (deference to reasonable agency statutory interpretation)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (Supreme Court) (traditional burden-shifting framework contrasted with AIR-21)
- Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (Supreme Court) (circumstantial evidence may satisfy discrimination causation)
- Marano v. Department of Justice, 2 F.3d 1137 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (contributing-factor standard in whistleblower context)
- Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (Supreme Court) (statutory rights distinct from contractual arbitration remedies)
- Union County v. Piper Jaffray & Co., 525 F.3d 643 (8th Cir. 2008) (standards for §1292(b) interlocutory certification)