Raudenbush, III v. Taylor
2:14-cv-00295
E.D. Tenn.Aug 14, 2017Background
- Plaintiff Raudenbush, a TDOC minimum-security inmate, was transferred from the Annex to the compound (Unit 7) on September 20, 2013 after an altercation in the Annex; he alleged the transfer increased his risk of harm.
- On September 24, 2013 Raudenbush mailed a sealed letter to Warden Sharon Taylor reporting that his cellmate Christian had stolen from him and had shown him a knife; Taylor wrote a note instructing staff to talk to and move Raudenbush if necessary.
- Early on September 25, 2013 Raudenbush was assaulted in his cell by inmate House (who allegedly gained access after Christian opened the door); Raudenbush claims he had warned several officers he feared for his safety.
- Plaintiff sued several NECX staff under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (failure to protect), and state-law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and assault/battery; some defendants and medical-care claims had been previously dismissed.
- Defendants moved for summary judgment arguing lack of personal involvement, lack of deliberate indifference, insufficient notice, and Eleventh Amendment immunity; the court granted summary judgment dismissing all remaining claims against all defendants.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether defendants can be held liable under § 1983 for failure to protect | Raudenbush contends Taylor and certain officers had actual notice of threats (letters and in-person warnings) and were deliberately indifferent | Defendants argue no personal involvement or actual notice (except Taylor read the Sept. 24 letter and instructed staff to investigate); mere supervisory status or inaction is insufficient | Court: § 1983 claims dismissed. Taylor’s reading of the letter showed reasonable response (instructed staff); other defendants lacked evidence of personal knowledge or deliberate indifference |
| Whether a transfer from Annex to compound created a protected liberty interest | Raudenbush contends transfer put him in a more dangerous, "gang" unit creating atypical and significant hardship | Defendants argue transfer within prison does not implicate constitutionally protected liberty interest absent atypical hardship | Court: Transfer did not create protected liberty interest; no Eighth Amendment violation from transfer alone |
| Whether officers’ searches and responses were objectively reasonable after alleged warnings about Christian | Raudenbush says he told Officers Chance and Lewis Christian had a knife and they failed to protect him | Defendants say officers conducted cell search and took reasonable steps; plaintiff cannot prove officers had actual, specific knowledge of a substantial risk | Court: Officers took reasonable steps (searches); summary judgment for defendants on this claim |
| State-law torts (intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault & battery) | Raudenbush alleges outrageous conduct and failure to protect causing severe emotional injury and that defendants’ actions caused imminent fear or contact | Defendants argue conduct, at most, was negligent and there is no evidence defendants committed overt acts causing imminent fear or touched plaintiff | Court: State-law claims dismissed—evidence shows negligence at best; no outrageous conduct, no overt acts or contact by defendants |
Key Cases Cited
- Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991) (Eighth Amendment standard for cruel and unusual punishment)
- Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (prison officials must take reasonable measures to guarantee inmate safety; deliberate indifference standard)
- Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993) (substantial risk of serious harm requirement)
- Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995) (liberty interest analysis for atypical and significant hardship)
- Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (2005) (transfer does not create liberty interest absent atypical hardship)
- Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416 (6th Cir. 1984) (supervisory liability under § 1983 requires active or knowing acquiescence)
- Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295 (6th Cir. 1999) (supervisor liability must be based on active unconstitutional behavior)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (summary judgment burden-shifting)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (standard for genuine issue of material fact at summary judgment)
- Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986) (court must view record in light most favorable to nonmoving party)
- Marsh v. Arn, 937 F.2d 1056 (6th Cir. 1991) (deliberate indifference requires obduracy and wantonness)
- Knight v. Gill, 999 F.2d 1020 (6th Cir. 1993) (prison officials’ duty to take reasonable steps to protect inmates)
