Rashad v. Lafler, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 6765

Rashad, a Michigan inmate, was convicted in 1989 of possession with intent to deliver 650+ grams of cocaine (a mandatory life sentence without parole at the time).
The trial court sentenced him to 40-100 years after ruling the life sentence violated the state constitution; Michigan later affirmed conviction but reversed the sentence.
In 2004 Rashad was resentenced after Michigan law changes; the new statutory regime imposed life with the possibility of parole under the amended 2003 drug laws.
The 2003 amendments eliminated the mandatory life component for 450-1000 grams and set a 30-year maximum, but were not retroactive to Rashad’s pre-amendment offense according to state courts.
Rashad sought federal habeas relief in 2008 raising six claims, which the district court denied and the Sixth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability.
The court addresses AEDPA limitations, jury instructions and evidentiary rulings, Fourth Amendment issues, and challenges to the sentencing scheme and retroactivity.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
AEDPA timeliness and final judgment timing	Rashad timely filed after resentencing finalizes judgment.	Limitations began with first judgment; retroactivity issues ignored.	Final judgment arises at resentencing; petition timely.
Jury instructions sufficiency	Evidence did not support aiding and abetting or a lesser-included offense instruction.	State evidence supported both theories; instruction proper under state law.	Instructions not reveals due process violation; proper under law.
Fourth Amendment search and seizure	Key seized from Rashad's briefcase violated the Fourth Amendment.	Search scope valid; suppression not required; police inventory issues do not negate validity.	No due process violation; Stone v. Powell precludes relief absent full and fair litigation.
Retroactivity of amended drug sentencing laws	Amended laws should apply retroactively to Rashad's case.	Legislation generally not retroactive absent clear directive.	No retroactive application of amended sentencing laws.
Equal protection due process in sentencing disparity	Older offenders get harsher sentences than similarly situated newer offenders.	Constitution does not guarantee identical sentences for different offenders.	No constitutional violation; disparity not unconstitutional.

Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147 (2007) (final judgment means sentence; timing of finality governs AEDPA clock)
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (mandatory minimums and proportionality in state sentencing)
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (Fourth Amendment claims foreclosed on habeas if could have been litigated on direct review)
Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113 (2009) (AEDPA timeliness and finality concepts)
Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005) (streamlining habeas proceedings and stay principles)
Scott v. Hubert, 635 F.3d 659 (2011) (timeliness clock begins after resentencing in related scenarios)
Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970) (equal protection not requiring identical sentences for different offenders)
Doe v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 490 F.3d 491 (2007) (state law claims assessable in federal habeas context where no retroactive relief)
Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991) (habeas review limits for state court evidentiary rulings)
Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694 (2000) (retroactivity presumptions in criminal legislation)