Raquel Pascoal Williams v. Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
741 F.3d 1228
11th Cir.2014Background
- Williams, a Brazilian citizen, married U.S. citizen Derek Williams on Jan 11, 2002; his I-130 was filed Dec 19, 2002.
- Ms. Pascoal was initially an ‘immediate relative’ under 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) based on the first sentence (spouse).
- Mr. Williams died Sep 17, 2003; DHS denied her status adjustment, ruling she was no longer an immediate relative.
- DHS advised that she could pursue an I-360 self-petition; she did so on Jul 16, 2004, but DHS denied because she had not been married two years before his death.
- Ms. Pascoal remarried Noel Wells on Aug 8, 2009 and divorced on Apr 8, 2010.
- She moved to reopen the I-130 under § 1154(l); DHS denied, relying on the remarriage bar in the second sentence of § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §1154(l) incorporates the entire §1151(b)(2)(A)(i) | Pascoal: only first sentence applies to her case | DHS: second sentence also incorporated and governs remarrying widows | §1154(l) incorporates only the first sentence; remarriage bar not triggered |
| Whether remarriage bars applying to self-petitions affect Pascoal’s eligibility under §1154(l) | Remarriage bar does not apply because eligibility is determined immediately prior to death | Remarriage bar applies to remarriage scenarios under the statute | Remarriage bar does not apply to Pascoal’s eligibility under §1154(l) |
| Whether the statutory structure supports applying §1154(l) independently of §1151(b)(2)(A)(i)’s second sentence | First sentence governs I-130; §1154(l) creates retroactive adjudication notwithstanding death | Statutory structure links the remarriage bar to certain petition paths | Text and structure support applying §1154(l) to the beneficiary petition without the remarriage bar |
Key Cases Cited
- Lockhart v. Napolitano, 573 F.3d 251 (6th Cir. 2009) (first two sentences do not modify one another)
- Taing v. Napolitano, 567 F.3d 19 (1st Cir. 2009) (two sentences operate separately for beneficiary vs self-petitions)
- Freeman v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2006) (two sentences do not modify each other; separate applications)
- Robinson v. Napolitano, 554 F.3d 358 (3d Cir. 2009) ( Third Circuit relied on tense interpretation; related to §1151(b)(2)(A)(i))