44 F.4th 1085
8th Cir.2022Background
- On Aug. 13, 2017, Randy McDaniel was arrested for shoplifting at a Pine Bluff Wal‑Mart; officers (including Neal and Detective Tamina Smith) found McDaniel unarmed and nonviolent.
- While in the loss‑prevention office McDaniel tried to flee toward a closed door; Smith grabbed his shirt and McDaniel grabbed her arm (she had also unholstered a taser); Neal grabbed McDaniel from behind.
- Neal wrapped his arms around McDaniel, pulled him back into the room, then took him to the ground in a forceful takedown; McDaniel suffered a broken collarbone, a skull fracture (52 stitches), and a traumatic brain injury.
- Body‑worn camera footage and still images did not blatantly contradict McDaniel’s account; witnesses described the move as a ‘‘body slam’’ or like professional wrestling.
- The district court denied Neal qualified immunity on McDaniel’s § 1983 excessive‑force claim; Neal appealed. The Eighth Circuit viewed the facts in McDaniel’s favor, found the takedown could be excessive, but concluded the right was not clearly established and reversed, granting qualified immunity and ordering dismissal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Neal used excessive force in detaining McDaniel | McDaniel: once Neal had a bearhug from behind and pulled him back, McDaniel was subdued; throwing him to the ground was excessive and caused severe injury | Neal: McDaniel was fleeing and grabbed Smith; officers reasonably used force to prevent escape and protect Smith | On the facts viewed for McDaniel, a reasonable jury could find the takedown excessive (district court’s view affirmed on the factual question) |
| Whether the excessive‑force violation was clearly established (qualified immunity) | McDaniel: general excessive‑force principles and analogous cases (e.g., bearhug takedown) put Neal on notice his conduct was unlawful | Neal: no controlling precedent squarely governing this fact pattern as of Aug. 13, 2017; officers entitled to immunity | The court held the law was not sufficiently specific to be clearly established; Neal entitled to qualified immunity (district court’s denial reversed) |
| Applicability of Arkansas Civil Rights Act (ACRA) claim | McDaniel made no separate ACRA argument; relies on § 1983 analysis | Neal: ACRA is coextensive with § 1983 and federal standards; qualified immunity applies | ACRA claim also barred by qualified immunity; dismissed |
Key Cases Cited
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (objective‑reasonableness standard for Fourth Amendment excessive force)
- Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (factors to consider in excessive‑force inquiry)
- Lombardo v. City of St. Louis, 141 S. Ct. 2239 (excessive‑force inquiry is fact‑specific and cannot be applied mechanically)
- Kelsay v. Ernst, 933 F.3d 975 (en banc) (bearhug takedown that broke collarbone; held not clearly established at that time)
- Jackson v. Stair, 944 F.3d 704 (analyzing sequential uses of force separately when circumstances change)
- Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148 (need for particularity in clearly established Fourth Amendment rights)
- Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7 (importance of specificity when defining clearly established rights)
- City & County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600 (courts must avoid defining clearly established law at high level of generality)
- Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (video evidence may ‘‘blatantly contradict’’ a plaintiff’s version of events)
- Ehlers v. City of Rapid City, 846 F.3d 1002 (limits of interlocutory appeal of qualified immunity denials)