Randall Amado v. Terri Gonzalez, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 13710

Background

In 1997 a drive-by shooting on LA bus No. 53 killed Corie Williams; Randall Amado was tried as an aider and abettor and convicted in 1998.
The key witness against Amado was Warren Hardy (who initially identified Amado to police), but at trial Hardy had poor vision, spotty memory, and was reluctant to testify.
The prosecution elicited Hardy’s pretrial identification through a detective’s testimony; defense counsel did not impeach Hardy with a prior felony conviction, probation status, or prior Bloods gang membership because counsel did not have those records.
After trial defense counsel obtained Hardy’s probation report showing a robbery conviction, active probation, and stated Bloods affiliation; counsel moved for a new trial under Brady and California Penal Code § 1181(8). The state courts denied relief (Court of Appeal affirmed on grounds that the evidence was not shown to be newly discovered/due diligence).
Amado filed federal habeas; the district court denied relief under AEDPA deferential review. The Ninth Circuit granted COA on Brady and reversed, holding the prosecution violated Brady and that suppression was prejudicial; relief: grant habeas unless DA seeks new trial within 60 days.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Amado)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Did the prosecution suppress Brady/Giglio impeachment material (Hardy’s conviction, probation, gang ties)?	The LA DA’s office had the records; failure to disclose materially impeaching information violated Brady.	The defense could/should have discovered the records; no suppression excused by counsel’s lack of diligence.	Suppression: yes. The DA’s office had access; trial counsel did not have the material and could not reasonably have discovered it pretrial.
Was the Court of Appeal’s reliance on California Penal Code §1181(8) (newly discovered/due diligence) a valid bar to Brady relief?	§1181(8) was applied in a way that effectively shifts Brady’s disclosure burden to the defense; state-court ruling was unreasonable under AEDPA.	The Court of Appeal permissibly found failure to show newly discovered evidence/due diligence, foreclosing Brady relief.	The Ninth Circuit held the state court’s §1181(8) finding was an unreasonable determination of the facts and contrary to clearly established federal law.
Was the suppressed evidence material (prejudice prong)?	The withheld impeachment would have meaningfully undermined Hardy’s credibility and thus the aiding-and-abetting theory, creating a reasonable probability of a different outcome.	Other witnesses placed Amado at the scene and Hardy was already heavily impeached on the stand (memory/identification problems), so no reasonable probability of different verdict.	Materiality/prejudice: yes. The court held the missing impeachment evidence could have put the case in a different light and undermined confidence in the verdict.
Standard of review under AEDPA for state-court Brady rulings	Where the Court of Appeal’s reasons are unreasonable, federal court may review de novo the unadjudicated elements and grant relief.	AEDPA requires deference; federal courts must not overturn state rulings unless objectively unreasonable.	Applied AEDPA deference to Court of Appeal’s ruling generally but concluded its factual/ legal application was unreasonable on key points and therefore federal habeas relief was appropriate.

Key Cases Cited

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecution must disclose evidence favorable to accused)
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (impeachment evidence of deals/agreements must be disclosed)
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (materiality standard: reasonable probability that outcome would differ)
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (prosecutor must learn and disclose favorable evidence known to agents, e.g., police)
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999) (Brady/Giglio framework and prosecutor’s special role)
Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004) (Brady elements summarized: favorable, suppressed, material/prejudicial)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (AEDPA deference: state-court rulings presumed adjudicated on merits; federal courts give deference to reasonable state-court conclusions)
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (AEDPA review principles; guidance on when de novo review of unadjudicated elements is appropriate)