Randall Amado v. Terri Gonzalez
734 F.3d 936
9th Cir.2013Background
- In 1997 a drive‑by shooting from a city bus killed Corrie Williams; Randall Amado was arrested and tried as an aider/abettor of the shooters. Amado convicted in 1998 and sentenced to 27 years‑to‑life.
- The key evidence tying Amado to bringing a gun to the scene was testimony from witness Warren Hardy, who on the stand had poor memory and eyesight; police testimony of Hardy’s prior identification of Amado was admitted through Detective Esquivel.
- After trial defense counsel obtained a probation report showing Hardy had a robbery felony, was on probation, and had been a member of the Piru Bloods gang—information the prosecution had not disclosed before or during trial.
- Amado moved for a new trial under California law and raised a federal Brady claim; state courts denied relief largely on procedural/new‑evidence grounds and for lack of diligence. State remedies were exhausted.
- On federal habeas, the district court denied relief; the Ninth Circuit granted a COA on the Brady issue and reversed, holding the prosecution violated Brady by suppressing material impeachment evidence and that the suppression was prejudicial, entitling Amado to a new trial unless retrial is initiated within 60 days.
Issues
| Issue | Amado's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether prosecution suppressed favorable impeachment evidence in violation of Brady | Prosecution withheld Hardy’s felony conviction, probation status, and gang membership—material impeachment that it had a duty to disclose | Defense counsel could and should have discovered these facts with due diligence; no suppression | Suppression: Yes. Prosecutors (and their office) had access; Brady required disclosure; state court’s reliance on diligence was incorrect |
| Proper standard of review under AEDPA | De novo or mixed review because the California Court of Appeal decided the claim on state‑law procedural grounds, not Brady merits | Apply AEDPA deference to state court decision | De novo review of Brady suppression conclusion because the Court of Appeal did not adjudicate Brady on the merits; even under AEDPA deference the denial was unreasonable |
| Materiality / prejudice (would nondisclosure undermine confidence in verdict) | The withheld impeachment evidence could have undermined Hardy’s credibility; without Hardy’s testimony no proof Amado had a gun or the specific intent to aid murder—reasonable probability of different result | Hardy was already extensively impeached on the stand; other witnesses placed Amado at the scene supporting aiding/abetting theory | Prejudice: Yes. There is a reasonable probability the verdict would have been different; Brady materiality standard satisfied |
| Remedy | New trial (Brady violation) | Deny relief; conviction stands | Remedy: Writ granted; conviction vacated and remanded—release unless prosecution seeks retrial within 60 days |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999) (prosecutor’s broad duty to disclose favorable, material evidence to ensure fair trial)
- Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (prosecutor must learn and disclose favorable evidence known to others acting for the government)
- United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (materiality standard: reasonable probability that disclosure would have affected outcome)
- Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (impeachment evidence regarding witness’s deals must be disclosed)
- Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (when state court addresses only part of claim, federal review may be de novo as to unadjudicated prongs)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (AEDPA requires deference to state court reasonable applications of federal law; relief only when state decision is objectively unreasonable)