Rand Resources, LLC v. City of Carson, 243 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1

Background

Rand Resources (Rand) had an Exclusive Agency Agreement (EAA) with the City of Carson to be the City’s sole agent negotiating with the NFL to build a stadium; the EAA included a renew‑by‑consent extension provision.
Rand alleges the City breached the EAA by allowing rival developer Leonard Bloom and his company (U.S. Capital) to act as the City’s representative, and that City officials concealed that conduct and made false promises about renewal.
Plaintiffs sued for breach of contract, tortious breach of contract/promissory fraud, fraud, and two interference claims (intentional interference with contract and with prospective economic advantage) against Bloom and U.S. Capital.
Defendants moved to strike under California’s anti‑SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16), arguing the challenged conduct was protected speech/petitioning in connection with a public issue; the trial court granted the motion, the Court of Appeal reversed in part, and the Supreme Court granted review.
The Supreme Court analyzed whether each cause of action “ar[ose] from” activity protected by § 425.16, focusing on subdivisions (e)(2) (statements in connection with an issue under consideration by a legislative body) and (e)(4) (conduct in furtherance of free speech in connection with a public issue).
The Court held most fraud‑based claims did not arise from protected activity (except two claims against Bloom/U.S. Capital); the intentional interference claims against Bloom did arise from protected activity and are subject to anti‑SLAPP analysis.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether claims arise from acts "in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative body" (§ 425.16(e)(2))	Rand: statements (including promises and denials) were tied to the EAA renewal and City conduct and thus arise from statements connected to the City Council’s consideration	City/Bloom: communications (including with NFL and Council members) were made in connection with the EAA renewal or stadium project and so are protected	Court: Only communications made while an issue was actually under consideration (or immediately pending) qualify. Bloom’s 2014 lobbying occurred while renewal was pending and is covered; many other statements (e.g., Wynder’s 2012 promise; Dear’s denials) were made before the issue was under review and are not covered.
Whether claims arise from conduct in furtherance of free speech in connection with a public issue (§ 425.16(e)(4))	Rand: identity of the City’s agent and representations about it are not matters of public interest; claims rest on private commercial disputes and misrepresentations	Defendants: stadium project is a public issue, and speech about who represents the City is intertwined with that public issue and therefore protected	Court: Building an NFL stadium is a public issue, but the specific misrepresentations about agent identity were not sufficiently connected to that public interest to be protected (too narrowly focused/attenuated), except Bloom’s communications with NFL re: franchise and his lobbying while renewal was pending, which did relate to the public issue and supply elements of the interference claims.
Whether misrepresentations (fraud and promissory fraud counts) are protected activity because they relate to the stadium/public interest	Rand: misrepresentations were about facts material to renewal/performance and not privileged; they gave rise to liability	Defendants: statements are speech that should be protected to encourage public‑interest participation	Court: Misrepresentations to Rand supplied elements of fraud claims, but most were not made in connection with a public issue or while the issue was under legislative review; Wynder’s 2012 promise was too remote in time to qualify under (e)(2), and the misrepresentations were not connected enough to public interest under (e)(4).
Whether intentional interference claims against Bloom arise from protected activity	Rand: Bloom’s contacts with NFL and City were evidence only, not the basis of interference claims	Bloom: his communications were in furtherance of petition/speech on a public issue and with the Council’s renewal process	Court: Bloom’s communications with NFL about bringing a franchise and his 2014 lobbying of Council while renewal was pending formed the basis of the interference claims and were protected under §§ 425.16(e)(2) and (e)(4); those two claims are subject to anti‑SLAPP and must proceed to the second‑stage showing.

Key Cases Cited

Rusheen v. Cohen, 37 Cal.4th 1048 (2006) (discusses SLAPP statute purpose)
Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc., 29 Cal.4th 53 (2002) (framework for § 425.16 and "arising from" analysis)
Baral v. Schnitt, 1 Cal.5th 376 (2016) (defendant’s burden at first stage to identify protected activity)
Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University, 2 Cal.5th 1057 (2017) (distinguishes speech that provides basis for liability from speech that is mere evidence)
Tuchscher Dev. Enterprises, Inc. v. San Diego Unified Port Dist., 106 Cal.App.4th 1219 (2003) (communications about public development formed basis of claims and were protected)
Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co., 19 Cal.4th 26 (1998) (elements of intentional interference with contract)
Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 44 Cal.4th 937 (2008) (elements of interference with prospective economic advantage)