Ramirez v. Commonwealth, 94 N.E.3d 809

On Nov. 5, 2015, police stopped a vehicle and discovered a stun gun on Jorge Ramirez during a patfrisk and a firearm plus extended magazine in the vehicle; Ramirez was charged under G. L. c. 140, § 131J (stun gun ban) and several firearms offenses.
Ramirez moved to dismiss the § 131J count, arguing the statute categorically bans an arm protected by the Second Amendment; the trial judge denied the motion and refused written findings.
The single justice reported the case to the full Supreme Judicial Court; the Court revisited its prior decision in Commonwealth v. Caetano (Caetano I), which the U.S. Supreme Court had vacated and remanded in Caetano v. Massachusetts (Caetano II).
The SJC concluded that stun guns constitute “arms” under the Second Amendment and that the Commonwealth may regulate but not absolutely ban them, including possible restrictions for categories of persons, licensing, and sensitive places.
The Court held § 131J’s absolute civilian ban is facially unconstitutional and ordered the stun-gun count dismissed with prejudice, but stayed entry of judgment for 60 days to allow legislative action.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether stun guns are "arms" protected by the Second Amendment	Ramirez: stun guns are bearable arms used for self-defense and thus protected	Commonwealth: § 131J bans a dangerous, unusual weapon not protected by Heller	Held: Stun guns are "arms" within Second Amendment protection
Whether an absolute civilian ban on stun guns violates the Second Amendment	Ramirez: categorical ban is unconstitutional under Heller/Caetano II	Commonwealth: the ban is permissible as a public-safety measure and stun guns are unlike commonly owned arms	Held: Absolute prohibition is unconstitutional; regulations short of a ban permissible
Whether § 131J can be salvaged by narrowing (partial invalidation/severance)	Ramirez: (implicit) statute is overbroad and should be invalidated	Commonwealth: statute serves legitimate safety goals and could be narrowed to target dangerous classes	Held: Court cannot judicially rewrite § 131J to limit it to prohibited classes; partial severance would be quintessentially legislative; statute is facially invalid
Remedy/timing: Whether to vacate immediately or stay to permit legislative response	Ramirez: dismissal of § 131J charge and relief should issue	Commonwealth: seek time for legislative response to preserve public safety	Held: Dismissal of § 131J charge; entry of judgment stayed 60 days for Legislature to act

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (Second Amendment protects individual right to possess arms for self-defense)
Commonwealth v. Caetano, 470 Mass. 774 (Mass. 2015) (SJC held § 131J constitutional; later vacated)
Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027 (2016) (U.S. Supreme Court vacated SJC reasoning as inconsistent with Heller)
United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939) (Second Amendment protects arms in common use)
Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320 (2006) (principles for narrowing remedies and partial invalidation)
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 440 Mass. 309 (2003) (stay of judgment to allow legislative response)
Commonwealth v. Brown, 466 Mass. 676 (2013) (severability/preservation of valid statutory portions)