975 F.3d 475
5th Cir.2020Background
- Ralph Walsh, a contract professor at the University of North Texas Health Science Center, was accused by a student of sexual harassment after a conference banquet; an investigator (Kaiser) prepared a report substantiating the complaint and recommending discipline.
- The University’s Faculty Grievance and Appeal Committee gave Walsh notice, 90 minutes to present, access to a redacted investigator report, and an internal hearing where Walsh testified and cross‑examined the investigator but the student did not testify.
- Walsh sought to introduce photos from the event (denied) and claimed one committee member (Schranz) was biased because he had served as the student’s preceptor.
- The Committee found Walsh violated the University’s sexual‑harassment policy and recommended termination; the President terminated Walsh before his contract expired.
- Walsh sued individual university officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process (biased tribunal; denial of a meaningful opportunity to confront the accuser and present evidence).
- The district court denied qualified immunity in part; the Fifth Circuit held Walsh suffered a due‑process deprivation (failure to hear the accuser) but reversed on qualified immunity, ruling the right was not clearly established and rendering judgment for defendants.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Committee bias (impartial tribunal) | Schranz was biased because he served as the accuser’s preceptor and had regular contact with her. | Single committee member’s familiarity is insufficient to show actual bias; adjudicators are presumptively impartial. | No merit — one member’s acquaintance alone does not establish actual bias; summary judgment on qualified immunity appropriate as to bias claim. |
| Right to confront/cross‑examine accuser | Walsh needed to hear and test Student #1’s testimony (real‑time cross‑examination or reasonable substitute) because credibility was dispositive. | Allowing cross‑examination of the investigator and use of the investigator’s report sufficiently protected due process; protecting complainant and administrative efficiency justified substitutes. | The panel should have heard the student; a neutral party’s real‑time questioning by the panel with opportunity for the accused to submit questions would have sufficed (accused need not personally conduct cross‑examination). Court found a due‑process violation on this ground. |
| Qualified immunity / Clearly established law | The general right to a meaningful hearing should have put officials on notice that excluding the accuser’s direct testimony violated due process. | Circuit precedent and other authority were inconclusive and split on whether confrontation is required in university proceedings; no “fair‑warning” authority. | Defendants entitled to qualified immunity — the specific right was not clearly established at the time. |
| Exclusion of photos (evidence) | Denying admission of photos hampered Walsh’s ability to rebut the student’s account and thus violated due process. | Photos’ relevance/timing was unclear; evidentiary rulings were within the committee’s discretion and not arbitrary. | Exclusion did not violate a clearly established constitutional right; no relief on this basis. |
Key Cases Cited
- Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (sets the three‑factor balancing test for what process is due)
- Levitt v. Univ. of Tex. at El Paso, 759 F.2d 1224 (5th Cir.) (describes due‑process protections owed to terminated professors)
- Plummer v. Univ. of Houston, 860 F.3d 767 (5th Cir.) (student‑discipline decision discussing confrontation and the weight of corroborating evidence)
- Haidak v. Univ. of Mass.‑Amherst, 933 F.3d 56 (1st Cir.) (favors some form of real‑time cross‑examination through the panel)
- Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (qualified immunity standard — protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law)
- Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924 (due process implicated when public employees can be discharged only for cause)
